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1Responding to First Responders:
A Proposal for a Smallpox Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
Abstract:
In December 2002, President Bush announced a plan to provide smallpox vacci-
nations to ﬁrst responders–individuals who would be on the front lines in the event of a
biological attack. To date, the plan has been unsuccessful because many ﬁrst responders are
unsatisﬁed with the protections provided for adverse reactions. In particular, a new federal
statute exempts manufacturers from liability and only permits negligence claims against
the United States. Additionally, many states have not determined the scope of their work-
ers’ compensation coverage. As a result, there is a rising demand for a federal program to
compensate for smallpox vaccine injuries. This Article analyzes three federal compensation
programs and recommends a smallpox compensation program based on lessons from these
programs. Finally, it outlines two new proposals by Representative Waxman and by the
Department of Health and Human Services.
On Thursday October 4, 2001, Florida health oﬃcials announced that doctors hospitalized a 63-year-old
man suﬀering from pulmonary anthrax.1 Quick to allay public fears following September 11, White House
oﬃcials dismissed the possibility of intentional transmission.2 One day later the man passed away.3 After a
co-worker also tested positive for anthrax, the FBI began to suspect bioterrorism.4
Over several months, fear of anthrax gripped the nation. Letters containing anthrax were sent to Senator
Daschle,5 Senator Leahy,6 and NBC news anchor Tom Brokaw.7 In the end, ﬁve people died and anthrax
spores contaminated several buildings. Once a hypothetical threat, the anthrax attacks demonstrated the
disruptive potential of bioterrorism and engrained it in the public consciousness. Though the anthrax attacks
1See Gina Kolata, Florida Man is Hospitalized with Pulmonary Anthrax, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 2001, at A16.
2Id. At a press conference, Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson declared that “[I]t is an isolated
case, and it is not contagious. There is no terrorism.” Id.
3Dana Canedy and Nicholas Wade, Florida Man Dies of Rare Form of Anthrax, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 2001, at A9.
4Dana Canedy and Alex Kuczynski, A Nation Challenged: A Medical Mystery; Second Case of Anthrax Leads F.B.I. to
Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 2001, at A1.
5Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Alison Mitchell, A Nation Challenged: The Overview; Letter Containing Anthrax Sent to U.S.
Senate Leader, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 2001, at A1
6Philip Shenon, A Nation Challenged: Discovery on Anthrax; Suspicious Letter to a 2nd Senator, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17,
2001, at A1.
7David Barstow, A Nation Challenged: The Incidents; Anthrax Found in NBC News Aide, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 2001, at
A1.
2were frightening, many oﬃcials expressed relief that the pathogen was not smallpox.
Clearly, the country was unprepared to handle a large scale bioterrorist attack. Before the anthrax attacks,
public health policy based on a perceived low probability of bioterrorism left the country vulnerable. In fact,
a June 2001 report to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (the “CDC”) by the multidisciplinary
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (the “ACIP”) recommended against resuming smallpox
vaccinations.8 Nevertheless, they cited a potential need to alter this policy if the threat of bioterrorism
increased. Following September 11, the CDC asked ACIP to reevaluate their proposal. ACIP responded by
recommending a limited vaccine program to health oﬃcials who would interact with victims of a smallpox
attack.9
Soon after the recommendations, President George W. Bush signed the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (the
“HSA”) into law.10 Most notably, the Act merged twenty-two federal agencies into one cabinet level agency
called the Department of Homeland Security. Among additional provisions, the Act gave the Secretary of
Health and Human Services (the Secretary of HHS) and the Secretary of Homeland Security power to develop
policies in response to biological and chemical threats.11
The White House quickly used this authority to announce a smallpox vaccination plan (the “Vaccination
Plan”) similar to the ACIP proposal.12 The plan called for the vaccination of all military and government
personnel who are or will be deployed in high-risk areas. Additionally, the plan calls for the formation and
vaccination of Smallpox Response Teams who would immediately respond to a smallpox attack. These ﬁrst
responders include physicians, health care workers, law enforcement oﬃcers and ﬁreﬁghters.
While vaccinations are mandatory for military personnel, they are optional for ﬁrst responders. As currently
8Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, Vaccinia (Smallpox) Vaccine Recommendations of the Advisory Commit-
tee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) 2001, 50 Morbidity and Mortality Wkl’y Rpt. 1 (June 22, 2001).
9Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, Recommendations of Using Smallpox Vaccine in a Pre-Event Vaccination
Program, 52 Morbidity and Mortality Wkl’y Rpt. 1 (Feb. 26, 2003). [hereinafter ACIP Proposal]
10See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codiﬁed in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C, 7
U.S.C. and 26 U.S.C.).
11Id.
12Remarks Announcing the Smallpox Vaccination Plan, 38 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2162-63 (Dec. 13, 2002).
3outlined, the non-military plan has two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, 500,000 health care workers will receive
the smallpox vaccine.13 Most of these people will be state health oﬃcials and groups of doctors from various
hospitals within each state. In the second phase, another 10 million individuals will be vaccinated. This
phase broadens the scope of vaccinations to police, ﬁreﬁghters, and emergency personnel.
Soon after the announcement, various government agencies began its implementation. On January 22,
the CDC shipped 20,000 doses of the smallpox vaccine to Connecticut, Nebraska, Vermont and Los Angeles
County.14 Two days later, following procedures prescribed by the HSA, Secretary of HHS Tommy Thompson
signed a declaration beginning voluntary vaccinations.15 On the same day, four Connecticut doctors were
the ﬁrst volunteers to be vaccinated.16
At the announcement for the Vaccination Plan, Secretary Thompson promised to complete the initial stage
of vaccination within thirty days.17 Despite the optimism and swift response within the government, the
public has been more cautious. In particular, a growing number of states,18 hospitals,19 and medical groups
have expressed reservations. 20 While there has not been an active smallpox vaccine program in the United
States for over twenty years, the epidemiological and anecdotal data suggests that the vaccine has very
serious side eﬀects. There are two major concerns with vaccinating ﬁrst responders. First, some public
health experts worry that ﬁrst resonders could inadvertently infect hospital patients or family members.
While ﬁrst responders may be willing to individually assume the risks from vaccination, the experts are
13Donald G. McNeil, Smallpox Inoculations Begin With 4 Connecticut Doctors, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 2003, at A10.
14Id.
15See Declaration Regarding Administration of Smallpox Countermeasures, 68 Fed. Reg. 4212 (Jan. 28, 2003).
16McNeil, supra note 13, at A10. Originally, Connecticut planned to publicly vaccinate 8 to 20 members of the state health
department’s Genesis Team to increase public conﬁdence. At the last minute, several members of the team refused vaccinations
because the nurses union was concerned that the state was rushing the vaccinations. Id. See also, William Hathaway, Union
Recommends Nurses Refuse Today’s Smallpox Shots, The Hartford Courant, Jan. 24, 2003, at B1.
17See Ceci Connolly, Bush Smallpox Plan Near Standstill; Medical Professionals Cite Possible Side Eﬀects, Uncertainty of
Threat, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 2003, at A6.
18See, e.g., Sabin Russell, State Health Chief Takes Issue With Smallpox Plan, S.F. Chron., Jan. 23, 2003, at A4. (stating
that a lack of federal guidance caused California Department of Health Service Director Diana Bonta to send a letter to the
CDC saying that “a lack of federal guidance is delaying California’s ability to complete our readiness eﬀort”).
19Pamela Ferdinand & Ceci Connolly, Turnout Low at Launch of Domestic War on Smallpox; Conn. First State to Carry
Out Bush’s Immunization Campaign, Wash. Post, January 25, 2003, at A12.
20Id.
4concerned about imposing these risks on others. Many physicians believe there are currently more immuno-
compromised individuals than there were when smallpox vaccinations ended. In particular, AIDS was a
ﬂedgling disease and chemotherapy was much less common. These individuals would be at a greater risk of
suﬀering serious side eﬀects if exposed to the smallpox vaccine.
The second concern is the signiﬁcant uncertainty surrounding compensation for vaccine injuries. In many
states, it is currently unclear whether workers’ compensation covers vaccine-related injuries resulting from
participation in a voluntary program. Many insurers only cover illnesses or injuries resulting from required
work. Additionally, the HSA protects the government, vaccine makers, and those administering the vaccine
from liability.21 In order to recover damages, an injured party must prove negligence. Therefore, it is not
clear that injured parties will receive compensation either through workers’ compensation or the tort system.
In response to this concern, there have been calls for a compensation program from various quarters. Some
hospitals have announced that they will not participate in the Vaccination Plan until the government resolves
the compensation issue.22 Responding to the decline in hospital demand, some states have signiﬁcantly
scaled back their vaccination plans.23 In response to these events, twenty-three U.S. senators sent a letter to
President Bush stating that the government must provide more medical help to those receiving vaccinations.24
Additionally, both Senator Daschle and Senator Byrd have introduced measures in the Senate calling for
compensation. Unfortunately, both pieces of legislation only mention the need for compensation, oﬀer no
substantive provisions, and have received little support. Even the Institute of Medicine (the “IOM”), a less
political organization, recommended that the Vaccination Plan address the compensation problem.25 With
21See 42 U.S.C. §233(p).
22For example, nine of the twelve largest hospitals in Colorado have initially decided to not vaccinate their workers. Smallpox:
Many Colorado Hospitals May Not Inoculate Workers, Vaccine Weekly, Jan. 29, 2003, at 17.
23Ferdinand & Connolly, supra note 20. While initially planning to vaccinate 12,000 people, Alabama adjusted the estimate
to 2,000 to 5,000. Id.
24Stephen Smith, After Three Decades, Vaccination Makes a Debated Return, Boston Globe, Jan, 24, 2003, at A6. In the
letter, the senators stated that “[I]t is wrong to ask millions of Americans to face the risks of smallpox vaccination without
doing all we can to protect their health and safety.” Id.
25See Institute of Medicine, Review of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Smallpox Vaccination
Program Implementation (2003). The IOM report adopts an interested posture to their argument. Their biggest concern
5this increased scrutiny, some public health experts have started to question whether there is even a suﬃcient
risk of biological attack to justify the dangers of immunization.26
It seems clear that the Vaccination Plan will fail without a resolution to the compensation problem. At
Secretary Thompson’s one month target date, it has fallen far short of his goal. Only 4,200 people, less
than 1% of the goal, had been vaccinated by February 22.27 These low numbers and the increased public
dissent illustrate the necessity for public discussion about society’s responsibilities for vaccine injuries. This
article attempts to contribute to the discussion in several ways. First, it describes the current legal regimes
governing compensation for smallpox vaccine injuries. Second, it presents the policy issues with a particular
focus on the issue of compensation and historical approaches to compensation programs. Finally, this
Article recommends a complementary compensation system for vaccine injuries. Assuming that signiﬁcant
compliance by ﬁrst responders is desirable, it recommends a compensation regime with the following features:
(1) manufacturer exemption for liability with right of contribution by the U.S. government for negligence,
(2) compensation for designated ﬁrst responders and secondary transmissions from ﬁrst responders, (3) no
compensation for non-ﬁrst responders, (4) tort-like approach with proof of causation, (5) table causation,
(6) table compensation, (7) federal control, and (8) administration by special masters.
In accomplishing these goals, this Article has seven parts. Following this introduction, Part II provides a
background of smallpox, the smallpox vaccine, and bioterrorism. Next, Part III outlines current legal regimes
for compensating smallpox vaccine injuries. In particular, it focuses on the availability of compenation
through common law tort theories, workers’ compensation, and HSA Section 304.
With the current law as background, the next three sections describe and analyze three diﬀerent historical
with the uncertainty is informed consent. It is not clear whether individuals can make an informed decision to receive a vaccine
if the compensation program has not been worked out. See id.
26Id. Dr. Linda Rosenstock, dean of the UCLA School of Public Medicine, stated “My concern is we had a politicization of
the scientiﬁc process. One might defend making national security actions and war plans on information that can’t be shared
with the public. I just can’t see any justiﬁcation for making public health policy in the same mindset of secrecy.” Id.
27Connolly, supra note 17, at A6.
6compensation programs. Part IV discusses the Swine Flu Act of 1976, which exempted manufacturers from
liability and compensated parties for injuries resulting from a national eﬀort to vaccinate against a virulent
strain of the ﬂu. It is an important model for the current discussion because its operation was similar to
HSA Section 304. Next, Part V discusses the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (the “NCVIA”), which
established a no-fault compensation system called the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (the “VICP”)
for children injured by childhood vaccines such as the measles, mumps, and rubella booster. 28 In addition,
it implemented provisions to facilitate recovery and expedite the claim process. It is also important because
several Senators have suggested using the NCVIA as a template for a smallpox compensation program. Part
VI then analyzes the 9/11 Victim’s Compensation Fund (the “9/11 VCF”). This newly enacted compensation
system has received much public scrutiny and oﬀers several lessons for constructing a compensation system.
Finally, Part VII analyzes these possibilities and recommends a limited compensation program for smallpox
vaccine injuries.
Part II: Background of Smallpox
In order to craft a compensation system, it is important to understand some background on smallpox and its
history. The ﬁrst section provides a simple introduction to the clinical manifestations of smallpox followed
by the history of smallpox in the second section. The third section then describes the smallpox vaccine and
its production while the fourth section provides a description of the common side eﬀects of the smallpox
vaccine. Finally, the ﬁfth section provides an overview of the threat of smallpox as a biological weapon.
A.
Clinical Signs of Smallpox
2842 U.S.C. §300aa-1-34.
7Smallpox is a speciﬁcally human disease caused by the variola virus.29 Viral transmission occurs through
inhalation of air droplets from an infected individual.30 Twelve to ﬁfteen days after infection, the individual
begins to experience fever and joint pain. A rash on the face and extremities develops several days later.
During the initial days of infection, people often confuse smallpox with chickenpox.31 Eventually the unifor-
mity of the pustules and their concentration around the face and extremites distinguishes smallpox. When
the body mounts an eﬀective immune response, scabbing develops and eventually results in the characteristic
pitted scar.
In addition to causing disﬁgurement, smallpox has a relatively high mortality rate. The exact rate varied
because of several factors. First, there are two forms of variola that vary by severity of illness: variola
major and variola minor.32 While individuals with variola minor may have the same number of pustules
as individuals with variola major, they have a less systemic reaction and are often ambulatory. Individuals
infected with variola minor died less than one percent of the time whereas those suﬀering from variola major
died ﬁfteen to twenty percent of the time.33 Second, the severity of the smallpox depended on the strain.
Individuals suﬀering from the African form had a twenty to thirty percent lower mortality rate than those
suﬀering from the Asian form.34 Finally, children died more often than adults. In Asia, mortality rates were
forty to ﬁfty percent for children compared with twenty percent for adults.35
When death occurs, it is normally from one of two causes. Five to ten percent of smallpox patients develop
29D.A. Henderson, Smallpox: Clinical and Epidemiological Features, 5 Emerging Infectious Diseases 537 (1999). The vari-
ola virus, along with the viruses causing vaccinia, cowpox and monkeybox, belongs to a genus of viruses known as Orthopoxvirus.
These four viruses can infect humans and are indistinguishable in cell cultures.
30Donald A. Henderson & Bernard Moss, Smallpox and Vaccinia, Vaccines (Stanley A. Plotkin & Walter A. Orenstein eds.,
1999). This mode of transmission made smallpox an excellent candidate for eradication. There was no animal reservoir so the
outbreak would end when no more people were available for infection. Additionally, transmission does not occur until the onset
of rash. A person with smallpox, however, would have a fever and be bedridden before onset of the rash. As a result, fewer
people come in contact with a contagious individual.
31F. Fenner et al., Smallpox and Its Eradication 105 (1988).
32Id. at 96. Despite the extensive history of smallpox, researchers ﬁrst noticed the existence of variola minor at the end of
the Nineteenth Century. In an early epidemiological study, researchers observed the existence of a “mild” variety that never
reverted to the more severe form. Id.
33Id. at 133.
34Id.
35Id. at 134.
8a hemorrhagic form that almost always results in death.36 This extreme form of smallpox results in bleeding
from the skin and intestinal tract. The remaining deaths normally result from a systemic reaction to the
virus that occurs one to two weeks after onset of the disease.37
B.
A Brief History of Smallpox
There is some evidence that ancient civilizations suﬀered from smallpox. The earliest evidence is three 3000
year-old Egyptian mummies with lesions clinically consistent with smallpox.38 Unfortunately, these ﬁndings
cannot be corroborated from other sources. Though Egyptians generally wrote about medical subjects,
archeologists have found no written evidence of smallpox. In India, however, the word masurika meaning
smallpox appears in several medical texts from the beginning of the Christian era.39 Additionally some
scholars point to the mention of “scabs” as evidence of a smallpox epidemic devastating Alexander’s army
in 327 B.C. as it camped along the Indus River.40 There is also scattered evidence of smallpox in other
cultures around this time period. Over the next several hundred years, medical knowledge increased. By
the end of the ﬁrst millennium, there were more extensive writings on smallpox. Interestingly, until the
end of the 1700’s, one of the most inﬂuential texts on smallpox in Europe was a book from 910 A.D. by a
Mesopotamian physician named Al-Razi.41
While the origin of smallpox is uncertain, its introduction to Europe can be traced to the Crusades in the
36D.A. Henderson, supra note 29, at 537.
37Id.
38“Inspection of the mummy revealed a rash of elevated ‘pustules’, each at about two to four millimeters in diameter, that was
most distinct on the lower face, neck, and shoulders, but was also visible on the arms.” D.R. Hopkins, Princes and Peasants,
Smallpox in History (1983).
39F. Fenner et al., supra note 31, at 211. The ﬁrst description of severe masurika appears in the writings of a physician in
the 7th Century A.D. A more extensive discussion of masurika was written in the following century with details of smallpox,
chickenpox and measles.
40Id.
41Id. In this text, al-Razi noted that smallpox was most common in the spring and disproportionately aﬀected children.
9Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries.42 Christians moving between Europe and southwestern Asia during this
time spread smallpox throughout Europe. As the population grew in Europe, smallpox became endemic.
There are substantial records from Fifteenth Century France of children suﬀering from smallpox. In fact,
the French originated the name smallpox by calling the disease “la petite verole” to distinguish it from “la
grosse verole” or syphilis. The English adopted a similar nomenclature resulting in the name “smallpox”
while they called syphilis the “great pox.”43
By the late Eighteenth Century, smallpox was a common cause of death in Europe. During the last two
decades of the Eighteenth Century, it was responsible for ten percent of the deaths in London.44 The
trend soon changed in 1796 when Edward Jenner developed the process of inoculation. Jenner observed that
cowmaids exposed to cowpox did not suﬀer from smallpox and postulated that the cowpox exposure conferred
immunity to smallpox. In order to test his hypothesis, Jenner transferred cowpox between individuals by
inoculating a person with the material from a cowpox lesion.45 The newly infected person was resistant.
This process of inoculation quickly spread throughout Europe with arm-to-arm contact being the preferred
method. Despite the early success of inoculation, a signiﬁcant dissent mounted because there were problems
with reoccurrence and transportation of stable vaccine. By the mid-1850’s, however, the harvest of material
from infected calves replaced arm-to-arm inoculation making transportation much easier.
With a better source of vaccine, the number of vaccinations in Europe increased while the incidence of
42Id at 214.
43The English and French called syphilis the “great pox” because the lesions were larger and more likely to be found on
adults.
44Fenner et al., supra note 31, at 213. From 1806 to 1810, smallpox killed over 800,000 Russians and infected another 8
million.
45Jenner called the process vaccination and the material vaccine from vacca, the Latin word for cow. Henderson & Moss,
supra note 30.
10smallpox decreased. By the end of World War I, most of Europe was smallpox free.46 The less developed
tropical areas of the world were not as successful. Many countries still relied on arm-to-arm inoculation.
Those individuals who harvested from calves had only several days before the tropical heat inactivated the
vaccine. In the late 1940’s, however, a new method of freeze-drying was introduced that produced a more
stable vaccine.47
In 1958, U.S.S.R Deputy Minister of Health Viktor Zhhdanov presented a report to the World Health As-
sembly arguing that smallpox eradication was feasible.48 The following year, the World Health Assembly
voted to start the eradication program. After several years of limited support and disappointing results, the
World Health Organization (the WHO) convened a committee to discuss the program. In 1966, the Director
General of the WHO recommended a budget increase to mount a more eﬀective eradication campaign.49
The intensiﬁed Global Eradication Program began the following year. It focused on two improvements: (1)
using potent and stabile vaccines in at least 80% of the population and (2) developing a system to detect
and contain outbreaks. This new approach slowly yielded results with the last naturally occurring outbreak
of smallpox occurring October 26, 1977 in Merka, Somalia.50 One year later, there were two cases of En-
glish laboratory workers being infected.51 In 1980 the World Health Assemby announced the eradication of
naturally occurring smallpox.52
46Id.
47Id.
48F. Fenner et al., supra note 31, at 367. The report presented a ﬁve year timetable for eradication: two years of vaccine
preparation, two years of vaccination, and one year of revaccination. In an interesting twist, the report began with a quote
from Thomas Jeﬀerson to Edward Jenner stating that “[I]t is owing to your discovery...that in the future the peoples of the
world will learn about the disgusting smallpox disease only from ancient tradition.”
49Id. at 409. The proposal increased the overall budget of the WHO by twenty-two percent.
50See World Health Organization, Declaration of Global Eradication of Smallpox, 55 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report 145 (1980).
51F. Fenner et al., supra note 31, at 349.
52See World Health Organization, supra note 50, at 145.
11C.
Smallpox and Biological Warfare
An interesting parallel to the history of smallpox is the history of biological warfare and the use of smallpox.
Since ancient times, there are examples of soldiers using biology to increase the lethality of their conven-
tional methods of killing. For example, Romans often dipped their swords in manure or rotting carcasses
and Scythian archers would plunge their arrows in feces or corpses before battle.53 In fact, this practice is
the origin of the word “toxin,” which is derived from the Greek word toxon meaning bow.54 Perhaps the
most credible account of an early biological attack is the siege of Kaﬀa in 1346 A.D.55
There is also some history of biological warfare in the United States. While there is no evidence of inten-
tional biological warfare before the 1700s, the natural transmission of disease had devastating consequences
on Native Americans. The initial settlement of the United States brought Eurasian disease like smallpox,
measles, and inﬂuenza. The subsequent slave trade brought additional diseases such as malaria and yellow
53Croddy, Chemical and Biological Warfare 219 (2002). These primitive examples diﬀer from modern biological warfare
in several respects. First, the method of killing remained unchanged. The soldier would still have to wield his sword or shoot
his arrow. Second, there is uncertainty about the eventual cause of death. Pretreatment undoubtedly increased the lethality of
a wound by inducing infection in the victim. There is no way to determine, however, whether the victim would have survived
the wound but for the biological agent.
54Joseph T. Shipley, Dictionary of Word Origins, at p. 195. More reﬂective of the modern biological warfare, some ancient
soldiers would use biology as the mode of killing. During the Second Macedonian War, around 190 B.C., Hanninbal’s men
would throw poisonous snakes onto King Eumene’s ships. Unlike the Scythian arrows, it was the bite of the snake rather than
its impact that delivered the mortal blow. In another example, retreating Greek soldiers would often place human or animal
remains in drinking wells. It is unclear whether their intent was to infect with disease or to deny potable water. In both case,
however, the mode of delivery and the means of death was the biological agent. See Mark Whellis, Biological Warfare Before
1914 in Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research Development and Use From the Middle Ages to 1914 (Erhard
Geissler & John Ellis van Courtland Moon Eds.) 1991.
55Id. at 13. Most of the details of the siege are based on eyewitness accounts relayed to an Italian, Gabriele de’ Mussi. Kaﬀa,
now known as Feodosia in the Ukraine, was an important Genoese city on the Crimean coast facing the Black Sea. It served
as a hub between maritime Mediterranean trade and overland caravans to the Far East. The thriving city was an attractive
target to invading Mongol troops. Kaﬀa, however, was protected by two concentric walls and diﬃcult to overrun. The Mongols
fought for over a year but eventually succumbed to the plague that killed them by the thousands. Before retreating, however,
the Mongols loaded their dead into catapults and ﬂung them into the city. Estimates of the death toll in the Kaﬀa region are
as high as 85,000 peeople. It is unclear, however, whether death resulted from the introduction of the diseased corpses or from
rats migrating from the surrounding areas to the city. Id. at 10-17
12fever. The novelty of these diseases ravaged the Native American population because they lacked previous
exposure meaning there was no previous natural selection for resistance. Additionally, experts suggest that
the Native American population had little genetic diversity.56 The result was a sweeping epidemic of disease
that roughly tracked European settlement patterns.57
The ﬁrst documented case of intentional transmission occurred during the French and Indian War. In 1763,
the French already had surrendered Canada and much of the British troops had returned to England. Pon-
tiac, chief of the Ottawas, had formed a loose confederation to push the British out of Canada and east
of the Alleghenies. In what is known as the Pontiac Rebellion, the confederation captured eight forts and
threatened further advance. Fort Pitt, now modern-day Pittsburgh, was under siege by both the Native
Americans and an outbreak of smallpox. The commanders responded by using the one threat against the
other. General Amherst writing to the regional ﬁeld commander Colonel Bouquet ordered that “you will
do well to try to inoculate the Indians by means of blankets, as well as to try every other method that can
serve to extirpate this execrable race.”58
During the 1800’s, the ﬁeld of microbiology grew rapidly. By the end of the century, researchers discov-
ered many common bacteria and understood their mechanism of action. Nevertheless, there was only small
progress in the development of biological weapons. While World War I witnessed the use of chemical weapons
on the battleﬁeld, there was very little use of biological weapons.59 In 1925, numerous countries ratiﬁed The
Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases and
56F.L. Black. Why Did They Die? 258 Science 1739 (1992). Smallpox epidemics typically had a mortality rate of twenty to
forty percent in European populations. In Native American populations, the fatality rate has been reported as high as ninety
percent.
57D.R. Snow Microtechnology and Demographic Evidence Relating to the Size of pre-Columbian North American Indian
Populations 268 Science 1601 (1995). There is no evidence that this devastation was the result of intentional infection. Never-
theless, evidence suggests that settlers understood the extent of the eﬀects. John Winthrop, the ﬁrst Governor of Massachusetts
Bay Colony, stated in a letter to a member of the English Parliament that “for the natives, they are neere all dead of the small
Poxe, so as the Lord hathe cleared our title to what we possess.” Whellis, supra note 54, at 15.
58Id. at 24.
59The Germans largely used biological weapons for sabotage. In 1915-17, while the United States was still neutral, German
agents cultivated anthrax and glanders bacteria. Evidence indicates that they attempted to infect some animal populations on
the Eastern seaboard. See Mark Whellis, Biological Sabotage in World War I in Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research
Development and Use From the Middle Ages to 1914 (Erhard Geissler & John Ellis van Courtland Moon Eds.) 1991.
13of Bacteriolocal Methods of Warfare (the “Geneva Protocol”).60 Surprisingly, the Germans adhered to
the Geneva Protocol prior to and during World War II.61 On the other hand, the Japanese developed an
extensive program and used biological agents on the Chinese. Estimates of the number of Chinese killed
vary greatly with some estimates over 100,000.62 Acting on the perceived threat of a biological attack by
the Axis, Allied nations such as the United States, Canada, and Great Britain developed active biowarfare
programs.63 Following World War II, both the United States and the Soviet Union continued to carry on
extensive programs.
Throughout the Cold War, smallpox research was an integral part of the Soviet and U.S. biological weapons
programs. When the WHO recommended that countries cease smallpox vaccination in 1980, it also recom-
mended that participating countries destroy their stocks of variola virus or give them to the WHO.64 All
countries reportedly complied with this mandate. The WHO also designated two laboratories to house serve
as a depository for the last stocks of smallpox: the Institute of Virus Preparations in Moscow, Russia and
the Center for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia.65
Despite this system for consolidating smallpox, there is substantial concern that a terrorist could use small-
pox in a biological attack. Recent reports indicate that the Soviets weaponized large quantities of smallpox
in the early 1980’s.66 Experts believe that the Soviet program annually produced several tons of smallpox
virus. Further, there are reports that Russia continues their predecessor’s bioweapons program. The stability
of Russia alarms Western experts for several reasons. First, there is concern that any remaining biological
60Id.
61See Sheldon Harris, The Japanese Biological Warfare Programme in Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research De-
velopment and Use From the Middle Ages to 1914 (Erhard Geissler & John Ellis van Courtland Moon Eds.) 1991.
62Id. at 39.
63See Gradon B. Carter and Graham S. Pearson, British Biological Warfare and Biological Defence 1925-45 in Biological
and Toxin Weapons: Research Development and Use From the Middle Ages to 1914 (Erhard Geissler & John Ellis van
Courtland Moon Eds.) 1991 and Donald Avery, Canadian Biological and Toxin Warfare Research, Development and Planning
1925-45 in Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research Development and Use From the Middle Ages to 1914 (Erhard
Geissler & John Ellis van Courtland Moon Eds.) 1991.
64See M. Radesky, Smallpox: A History of the Rise and Fall, 18 Ped. Infectious Disease J. 85 (1999).
65See id.
66See Ken Alibek, Biohazard 109-22 (1999).
14materials could fall into the wrong hands. Second, there is concern that expert scientists will free-lance
their services to the highest bidder. Both concerns are elevated by the decreasing ﬁnacial support for a once
sophisticated Russian science program. In addition to the Russian threat, there is also a possibility that a
rogue nation or terrorist network could acquire smallpox from a diﬀerent source. In a recent Senate com-
mittee hearing, Senator Bill Frist stated that ten to fourteen countries have developed oﬀensive biological
weapons programs.67
Smallpox in the wrong hands is frightening because it is an eﬀective biological weapon. It can be produced in
large quantities at relatively low cost.68 Additionally, it is very stable and is easily dispersed in an aerosolized
form that only requires a small amount to cause infection.69 Finally, unlike anthrax, it is contagious. Some
experts estimate that smallpox could spread by a factor of ten to twenty times each generation. This esti-
mate would mean that an initial infection of ﬁfty individuals could spread to 400,000 by the third generation.
D.
The Smallpox Vaccine
A ﬁrst line of defense against a smallpox attack is the smallpox vaccine. While there are currently several
vaccines available, the Vaccination Program uses the Wyeth Dryvax vaccine. This vaccine is the only one
available that the FDA approved for use.70 Wyeth Laboratories discontinued production of Dryvax in 1982
and has not distributed the vaccine to civilians since 1983.71 In 1990, the military discontinued vaccinating
67The Smallpox Vaccination Plan: Challenges and the Next Steps. Before the Sen. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor
and Pensions, 109th Cong. (2003) (Statement of William Frist) [hereinafter Smallpox Hearings]
68Donald A. Henderson, Smallpox as a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public Health Management, 281 JAMA 2127 (1999).
69Id.
70Steven Rosenthal et. al., Developing New Smallpox Vaccines, 7 Emerging Infectious Diseases 920, 920 (2001).
71Center for Disease Controls, Smallpox Vaccine No Longer Available for Civilians, 32 Morbidity and Mortlity Weekly
Reports 387 (1983).
15its personnel.72
The smallpox vaccine does not use the variola virus that causes smallpox. Rather, the smallpox vaccine is
a preparation of vaccinia virus, an Orthopoxvirus related to the variola virus.73 Interestingly, the vaccinia
virus is a descendent of the cowpox virus used by Jenner. The human manipulation of the cowpox virus
created the new virus that was called the vaccinia virus.
The older production method used to produce Wyeth Dryvax was very primitive. In a process called
“scariﬁcation”, the ﬂank and abdomen of a calf (the “vaccinifer”) is scored in a grid pattern.74 The seed
vaccinia virus is rubbed into the scariﬁed area and allowed to incubate for several days. After the incubation
period, the skin has viral lesions that are removed by scraping the skin. These scrapings (the “vaccine pulp”)
are then puriﬁed, dried, and reconstituted.
Health care workers administer the vaccine with a bifurcated needle dipped in the vaccine. The workers
prick the subject ﬁve to ﬁfteen times on the arm with the needle. An eﬀective vaccination, or “take”, results
in the formation of a pustular lesion at the vaccination site six to ten days after vaccination.75 A scab
forms and leaves a scar after approximately three weeks. The vaccine works by eliciting an immune response
to the antigens of the vaccinia virus. These vaccinia antibodies also recognize variola because the viruses
are closely related. The vaccine, therefore, allows the body to mount an immune response quickly against
smallpox.76 In fact, doctors recommend receiving a vaccine even after exposure to natural smallpox because
the production of antibodies against the vaccinia vaccine is quicker than against natural smallpox.
72Center for Disease Controls, Vaccinia (Smallpox)Vaccine, Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (ACIP), 50 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (2001).
73See Rosenthal et al., supra note 70, at 940. The vaccinia virus used for the vaccine has been passed through numerous
generations of calves rendering the virus less virulent.
74F. Fenner et al., supra note 31, at 280. Researchers chose this area of the calf because it is less susceptible to contamination
from excretions.
75Rosenthal et al., supra note 70, at 920.
76F. Fenner et al., supra note 31, at 295. The nature of the immunity depended upon the amount of time since the
vaccination. In the years immediately following vaccination, the body can mount a suﬃcient immune response to prevent any
viral replication. An infection several years after vaccination may result in replication but no symptoms. After many years,
however, the vaccination may have little eﬀect and variola infection could lead to death. Id at 295.
16This ability to confer immunity post-exposure is the reason that the U.S. wants ample supplies available.
In fact, Secretary Thompson announced a goal to have enough vaccine stockpiled by the end of 2002 to
vaccinate every U.S. citizen in the case of a smallpox attack. This supply of smallpox vaccine would be
expected to come from several sources. First, the U.S. government has a stockpile of 15.4 million doses of
the Wyeth Dryvax smallpox vaccine. While this vaccine is being used for the Vaccination Plan, there would
still be some available for the general public in the case of an attack. Additionally, clinical studies by the NIH
indicated the vaccine could be diluted one in ﬁve and still be eﬀective. Second, the vaccine manufacturer
Aventis Pasteur recently discovered a stockpile of 85 million doses of smallpox vaccine at a Pennsylvania
production facility.77 Even though Aventis produced the vaccine in 1958, studies show it is still eﬀective.78
The Aventis vaccine and Wyeth Dryvax were both produced by scariﬁcation but the Dryvax was freeze-dried
whereas the Aventis is in liquid form.
The U.S. government also has a contract with the British biotechnology ﬁrm Acambis to supply 209 million
doses of smallpox vaccine.79 Whereas the Wyeth and Aventis vaccines were produced by scariﬁcation,
Acambis produces the newer vaccine in cell culture. This method is cheaper, cleaner, and less likely to be
contaminated. The U.S. government also has contracts with Acambis and Danish biotech ﬁrm Bavarian
Nordic to conduct initial trials of a new smallpox vaccine that does not threaten immuno-compromised
individuals.80
D. Complications from the Smallpox Vaccine
77See Melody Peterson, A Nation Challenged: The Drug Makers; A New Batch of Old Smallpox Vaccine, N.Y. Times, March
29, 2002, at A19.
78See Robert Pear, A Nation Challenged: The Bioterrorism Threat; Smallpox Vaccine is Still Potent, Oﬃcials Say, N.Y.
Times, March 30, 2002, at A8.
79See Nic Hopkins, U.S. Asks Acambis to do Smallpox Work, The Times (London), Feb. 26, 2003, at 27.
80See id.
17Even though the vaccine does not use the variola virus, it can still result in serious complications including
skin infections, encephalopathy, and other unusual reactions. The following section lists the most common
side eﬀects observed from previous vaccinations.
1.
Eczema vaccinatum
Individuals with a history of eczema can develop eczema vaccinatum. Eczema is a common, hereditary
autoimmune disorder characterized by patches of chronically red and irritated skin.81 When individuals who
suﬀer from eczema receive the smallpox vaccine, they can develop lesions where they normally have eczema
in addition to the lesion at the vaccination site.82 These eruptions can spread to healthy skin and are usually
accompanied by high temperature and swollen lymph nodes. One estimate of the fatality rate for eczema
vaccinatum is ten percent.83
2.
Progressive Vaccinia
Progressive vaccinia occurs in individuals with comprised immune systems such as individuals with defec-
tive immunity, individuals taking immunosuppressive drugs, and individuals with AIDS.84 With progressive
vaccinia, the body is unable to mount an eﬀective immune response against the vaccine. The vaccine site
81See Donald A. Henderson et al., Consensus Statement: Smallpox as a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public Health
Management 281 JAMA 2127, 2135 (1999).
82Id.
83Id.
84Id.
18does not heal and the eruptions soon spread.85 The fatality rate for individuals with progressive vaccinia is
up to seventy-ﬁve percent.86
3.
Generalized vaccinia
Generalized vaccinia occurs in a small number of healthy individuals. With a routine vaccination, a lesion
only develops at the vaccination site. However, individuals with generalized vaccinia develop lesions through-
out their body. These individuals may experience high fever and discomfort though death is rare.87 In one
of the ﬁrst reported adverse reactions during the Vaccination Plan, a Florida nurse suﬀered from generalized
vaccinia. Press accounts characterized her reaction as vaccinia lesions covering her chest and back. Doctors
are treating the nurse with antihistamines and are hopeful that she will recover without scarring.88
4.
Accidental inoculation
Accidental inoculation occurs when the vaccinated individual transfers the vaccinia virus from the vacci-
nation site to another part of her body or to another person. When smallpox vaccination occurred, this
complication was the most common and least serious. The most common locations for transferal were the
eyelids and the vulva. Recently, doctors hospitalized a woman in California with an eye infection resulting
85F. Fenner et al. supra note 31, at 300.
86Rosenthal et al., supra note 70 at 921.
87Henderson et al., supra note 81 at 2135.
88See Ceci Connolly, Reactions May be Linked to Vaccine; 3 Workers Report Serious Side Eﬀects, Wash. Post, Feb. 28,
2003, at A8.
19from contact with a vaccinated military personnel.89
5.
Postvaccinial Encephalopathy and Encephalitis
Encephalopathy occurs in individuals younger than two years old. Severe symptoms, such as fever and
convulsions, begin about a week after vaccination. Encephalopathy can be fatal and most individuals who
suﬀered from it did not fully recover.90 Postvaccinial Encephelitis generally occurred in individuals older than
two years. It starts with fever, headache and vomiting. Individuals can become drowsy and disoriented.
Additionally, they can suﬀer from convulsions and potentially slip into a coma. The mortality rate is
approximately thirty-ﬁve percent.91
Conclusion
While the smallpox vaccine does not use the variola virus, it is still a risky vaccine. Approximately seven
to nine individuals died every year during the U.S. smallpox vaccination program.92 The majority of these
deaths were attributed to postvaccinial encephalopathy. It is not clear whether the current program would
have a similar rate of side eﬀects since the vaccine was primarily administered to children. On the other hand,
a cause for concern is the incidental infection of immune compromised individuals such as AIDS patients
and cancer patients receiving chemotherapy.
Part IV: Traditional Vaccine Liability and Existing Regimes
89See Lisa Richardson, Infection Tied to Smallpox Vaccine; The Eye Problem is Linked to Contact with a Member of the
Military Who was Inoculated, L.A. Times, March 1, 2003, at M2.
90Henderson et al., supra note 81, at 2135.
91Id.
92Rosenthal et al., supra note 70, at 921.
20Normally a person suﬀering an injury could bring a tort claim under a common law theory. Additionally,
workers suﬀering injuries arising out of employment could receive workers’ compensation. In order to better
understand the current liability regime and its alternatives, the ﬁrst section provides a brief survey of the
history of products liability then summarizes the current doctrines. The next section provides an overview
of workers’ compensation and discusses its applicability to the President’s vaccine program. Finally, the last
section discusses the eﬀect of HSA Section 304 on these compensation regimes.
A.
A Brief History of Products Liability
A historical view of products liability shows a shift from cabining liability to liberalizing recovery. Before
the 1960’s, there was little litigation against vaccine manufacturers. During this time, however, there was
extensive development in the common law. As the modern products liability law began to develop, the
number of claims against vaccine manufacturers dramatically increased. Currently there are several common
law theories of liability for vaccine injuries including negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, and failure
of the duty to warn. Though HSA Section 304 limits the applicability of many of these theories, they are
still useful to discuss. This section outlines these theories by recapitulating their historical development.
Early drug and vaccine cases were brought under negligence theories. As deﬁned in a leading treatise,
negligence claims have four elements: (1) a duty to a certain standard of conduct, (2) a breach of the
duty, (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the injury, and (4) actual loss or damage suﬀered
by another individual.93 Though this theory of liability was available, early courts severely restricted its
scope. This limitation resulted from the famous English case of Winterbottom v. Wright involving a defective
93Prosser and Keeton on Torts 164-165 (West 5th Ed. 1984).
21horse-drawn coach that injured the driver.94 As a result of a chain of independent contractors, the plaintiﬀ
sued a company that did not hire him directly. The obscure facts of the case created the question whether
the action was in tort or in contract. Counsel for defendant argued the defense of privity applied whether
“the form in which the action is conceived be ex contractu or ex delicto.”95 In ﬁnding for the defendant,
the court noted that there was no privity between the driver and the contractor.96 It is a notable case for
several reasons. First, it is an early attempt to limit the scope of liability for defective products. Second, in
attempting to limit the scope of liability, it had a lasting eﬀect on products liability law by conﬂating the
theories of tort and contract. In order for plaintiﬀs to bring a successful negligence claim, there must be
privity of contract.
Despite this early privity requirement, some courts found exceptions.97 Perhaps the most famous case was
Thomas v. Winchester where the defendant sold an extract of the poison belladonna to another druggist in
a jar labeled as dandelion extract. 98 In ﬁnding liability, the court noted that the defendant’s duty arose
“out of the nature of his business, and the danger to others incident to its mismanagement.”99
94Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). While these facts of Winterbottom are relatively simple, the
relationship between the plaintiﬀ and defendant is complicated. The defendant wanted coaches and drivers to deliver mail.
He contracted with the Postmaster General to provide and repair the coaches. The defendant then contracted with a person
named Atkinson to provide the horses and drivers. Atkinson hired the plaintiﬀ to be a driver of a coach. So Atkinson hired the
plaintiﬀ to drive the Postmaster General’s coaches to deliver mail for the defendant. While the plaintiﬀ was on his route, the
coach broke and threw him to the ground.
95Id. at 405
96In his opinion, Baron Rolfe stated that “there is no point at which such action would stop. The only safe rule is to limit
the right to recover to those who enter into the contract: if we go one step beyond that, there is no reason why we should
not go ﬁfty.” Id. At 405. Many commentators suggest that this case wrongly imported contract principles into the tort
setting. Nevertheless, these same commentators note the pragmitism of the judges. In the background of the case, even in the
mid-1800’s, there was signiﬁcant concern about the liability exposure of manufacturers and distributors. In their opinions it
was clear that the court imported the idea from contract to cabin liability
97Judge Sanborn summarized these exception in Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Machine Co: (1) negligence by the manufacturer
or vender that was “immeninetly dangerous” and committed in the preparation of an article intended to “preserve destroy or
eﬀect human life”, (2) the owner’s act of negligence that causes injury to a person invited by the owner to use a defective
appliance upon the owner’s property, and (3) sale of an article known to be dangerous to life or limb without notice of the
qualities that causes reasonably anticipated injuries. Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
98See Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
99Id. at 400.
22At the start of the century, courts still operated within a liability regime requiring privity or an exception
to the rule such as Thomas v. Winchester. Justice Cardozo’s majority opinion in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co100 marked the end of this approach. In MacPherson, the court held that the principle of Thomas
v. Winchester would not be conﬁned to inherently destructive items such as poisons and explosives. Judge
Cardozo reasoned that this category of dangerous items should include ordinary items that are rendered
dangerous through negligence. If the manufacturer knows that persons other than the purchaser will use
the item, then they are under a responsibility to make the item carefully. Other courts quickly followed this
idea and the privity requirement soon disappeared.
Despite the disappearance of the privity requirement, plaintiﬀs still needed to prove negligence. For many
cases this task was diﬃcult. Academic legal literature discussed the possibility of holding manufacturers
liable without fault to circumvent this problem and facilitate recovery. This doctrine, eventually called
“strict liability” only required proof that the product caused the injury. The judicial acknowledgement of
strict liability ﬁrst appeared in the California Supreme Court case of Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company
of Fresno.101 The case involved a waitress injured by a Coke bottle that exploded while she was putting
it in the restaurant’s refrigerator. In his concurring opinion, Justice Traynor stated that “it should now be
recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article that he has placed on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injuries to human
beings.”102 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Traynor relied heavily on several policy arguments. First,
he argued that “public policy demands that responsibility be ﬁxed whenever it will most eﬀectively reduce
100See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. In the case, the plaintiﬀ purchased a 1909 Buick from a dealer in Schenectady,
N.Y. While driving his car at eight miles per hour, one of the wooden wheels broke and the car collapsed injuring McPherson.
There was a privity problem because Buick purchased their tires from the Imperial Wheel Company.
101Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944)
102Id. at 440.
23the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market.”103 This reasoning
introduced the idea of assigning liability to the person who can take the cheapest measures to avoid the
injury.104 Second, he argued that “the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed
among the public as a cost of doing business.”105 Almost twenty years later, in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, the California Supreme Court adopted Justice Traynor’s theory of absolute liability.106
Two years after Greenman, the American Law Institute promulgated the Restatement (Second) of Torts
Section 402A. This section had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on products liability and still continues to have an eﬀect.
As an operative matter, it does not require negligence. Rather a manufacturer is liable under Section 402A
if the plaintiﬀ proves that: (1) the product was in an unreasonably dangerous and defective condition at
the time of the injury, (2) the defendant supplied the product, (3) the defect caused the injury, and (4) the
product was defective when it was sold.107 Consistent with the evolution of the common law, Section 402A
does not require privity. Though the language of Section 402A is potentially expansive, comment k carves
out an exception for unavoidably unsafe products. The comment deﬁnes unavoidably unsafe products as
“incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.”108 If the product is properly prepared,
marketed and labeled then there is no strict liability against the manufacturer of an unavoidably unsafe
product.
Vaccines are the paradigmatic unavoidably unsafe product. In fact, comment k uses a vaccine example to
illustrate the rule:
103Id. at 441.
104See, Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents; A Legal and Economic Analysis (1970)
105Escola, 150 P.2d at 441.
106Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (holding that a manufacturer is “strictly liable in tort
when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to a human being”). Id at 900.
107Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A.
108Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A, comment k.
24An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not un-
commonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when injected. Since the disease
itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine
are fully justiﬁed, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve.
Such a product, properly prepared and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is
not defective, not is it unreasonably dangerous.
As a result, vaccine products liability cases frequently involve comment k issues.
Comment k says that strict liability does not apply to unavoidably unsafe products if they are properly pre-
pared, marketed, and labeled. Additionally, comment j requires that the manufacturer give the user ample
warning. The basis for liability is a combination of a comment k failure to properly label and a comment j
requirement to give a user ample warning. The exact doctrinal underpinnings of these cases can be unclear.
Some courts hold that the defendants were negligent in discharging their duty to warn. Others hold the
defendants strictly liable for an unsafe product because they did not discharge their labeling duties under
comment k to be an exempt unavoidably unsafe product. Some commentators suggest that the diﬀerence
between the two inquiries is that negligence focuses on state of mind whereas strict liability focuses on the
state of the product.109
A signiﬁcant amount of litigation surrounds the manufacturer’s failure to warn about the risks of a vaccine.
The origin of this theory of liability is a string of cases in the late 60’s and early 70’s. The ﬁrst and most
famous case is Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories where the court noted that the manufacturer had a duty to
warn the public of the risks.110 The court reasoned that the failure to adequately warn the public created
an “unreasonably dangerous” product and the defendant was strictly liable for any resulting injuries. While
a warning by the prescribing doctor would ordinarily suﬃce, the court held that the mass immunization
context placed a greater burden on the manufacturer to supply the information.
109David G. Owen et al., Madden & Owen on Products Liability, §9:3.
110See Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
25This case opened the door for other plaintiﬀs to bring claims against vaccine manufacturers. In another
watershed case, Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, the Fifth Circuit liberalized recovery by lowering the burden
of proof for causation. In this case, an infant contracted polio two weeks after receiving the polio vaccine.
The court ruled that the manufacturer failed to warn the plaintiﬀ of alternative vaccines. As a result, the
court held that the vaccine was unreasonably dangerous because it did not provide adequate warnings.111
Additionally, the court created a rebuttable presumption that a consumer warned of the risks will act to
properly minimize her risks. In applying the rebuttable presumption, however, the court did not consider
that there was an epidemic outbreak of polio in the neighborhood. These facts combined with the holding
virtually eliminated the requirement of causation.
As a result of the Davis and Reyes decisions, vaccine manufacturers had several duties. First, they must
ensure that vaccinees are informed of the risk. The information can come from the doctor acting as a learned
intermediary or it must come from the manufacturer. Second, the information must adequately describe the
risks. These requirements are very amorphous and led to increasing recoveries throughout the early 1980’s
until passage of the NCVIA. The NCVIA, however, does not cover the smallpox vaccine. Absent HSA Section
304, plaintiﬀs could bring a duty to warn case against smallpox vaccine manufacturers. Though these claims
would not always be successful, they would provide some individuals an avenue to receive compensation.
While breach of the duty to warn has been the most successful theory of recovery, plaintiﬀs could bring other
theories for recovery. Plaintiﬀs could bring a negligence claim. Though courts no longer require privity, re-
covery under this theory is diﬃcult for several reasons. First, many vaccine injuries are not the result of
negligent conduct rather they are an unavoidable side eﬀect. Second, even if there was negligence, it can be
diﬃcult to obtain information proving the manufacturer was negligent.
Plaintiﬀs could also bring a claim for breach of warranty. This theory relies on the intermingling of contract
111In reaching this holding the court rejected the argument of the American Academy of Pediatrics in their amicus brief that
the mandatory vaccination laws obviated the need for warnings.
26and tort theories present in Winterbottom v. Wright. The warranty can be either express or implied and the
plaintiﬀ only needs to show that the product does not comply with the warranty. There is no requirement
to prove negligence.
Another possibility is a manufacturing defect claim. As a general rule, there are very few manufacturing
defect cases because the FDA exercises substantial oversight over vaccine production so there are few errors.
112 Perhaps the most famous was the Cutter litigation during the late 50’s and early 60’s. These cases
resulted from the accidental distribution of polio vaccine containing a live, virulent strain.113 If a vaccine
injury did result from a deviation from best manufacturing practices then this theory would be available.
On the whole, however, there are very few manufacturer defect cases.
On the other hand, there has been more design defect claims particularly when another manufacturer pro-
duces a diﬀerent vaccine.114 Absent HSA Section 304, there may have been some claims under this theory
because of the availability of a diﬀerent manufacturing technique. Individuals in the Vaccination Program
will receive Wyeth Dryvax, which is produced by scariﬁcation. Though it is in limited supply, the Acambis
vaccine is produced using cell culture techniques. It is foreseeable that injured parties could claim that a
manufacturer should have produced the vaccine by cell culture. On the other hand, manufacturers might
have a strong defense that they produced the older vaccine over thirty years ago before the availability of
cell culture techniques.
In conclusion, there are various theories of liability available at common law. Historically, breach of the duty
to warn has been the most common and successful. Nevertheless, there are other theories available. While
some plaintiﬀs would not be successful, tort claims provide the opportunity for compensation. As seen in
Section C infra, HSA Section 304 removes the availability of many of these theories.
112See Matthew Bender’s Products Liability at §51.05(1)
113See Note, The Cutter Polio Vaccine Incident, 65 Yale L.J. 262 (1955).
114See Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987) (holding the manufacturer liable for a defective design because
a competitor developed a safer vaccine).
27B.
Worker’s Compensation
President Bush’s vaccine proposal outlines certain ﬁrst responders who will be eligible for the smallpox
vaccine. These individuals were chosen because their jobs place them on the front lines responding to
biological attack. As a result, it would seem sensible that ﬁrst responders injured from the vaccine could
receive workers’ compensation. While this conclusion is common sense to some individuals, the availability
of workers’ compensation has been a source of great uncertainty.
Worker’s compensation is a government-mandated mechanism to compensate workers for work-related in-
juries.115 The substantive contours of a workers’ compensation program vary by state. Additionally, federal
employees receive workers’ compensation under the Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA) admin-
istered by the Department of Labor. Nevertheless, there are some typical provisions in most statutes and
regulations.
First, employees generally are entitled to beneﬁts for any injury resulting from an accident that “arises out
of and in the course of employment.”116 Second, the negligence or fault of the employer or employee does
not matter. Third, beneﬁts are usually limited to employees rather than independent contractors. Finally,
the employee normally waives her right to sue the employer for damages for an injury covered by the act.
Usually, the employer must secure their workers’ compensation liability through private insurance, state-fund
115Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law §1.01
116Id.
28insurance, or self-insurance.117
As a key conceptual point for discussing the appropriate compensation regime, it is important to diﬀerentiate
strict liability in tort and workers’ compensation. An obvious distinction is who bears the cost. As a ﬁrst
cut, the manufacturer bears the cost in a strict liability claim and the employer bears the cost in a workers’
compensation claim. Presumably, both individuals can spread these costs with their other costs of business.
A manufacturer would spread the cost to other individuals who purchase his goods while the employer
spreads the costs to the purchasers of his goods or services.
There is a subtler diﬀerence. Both strict liability and workers’ compensation do not require fault meaning
that there can still be recovery for injuries caused by non-negligent conduct. In a claim for damages under
strict liability, the person must prove that the vaccine caused the injury. In a workers’ compensation claim,
however, the claimant must only show that the injury arose from the course of employment.118 Additionally,
there are no defenses in a workers’ compensation claim whereas strict liability tort claims oﬀer several
aﬃrmative defenses such as contributory negligence or act of god.
So the outcome of a strict liability claim largely turns on whether the injury “arises from employment.”
This is an area of workers’ compensation where states take diﬀerent approaches. There are currently three
major methods: (1) the increased risk test—the claimant must show that the nature of the work exposed
her to a higher risk of injury than the normal population, (2) the actual risk test—the claimant must show
117Id.
118Perhaps a stylized example would illustrate the point. Suppose a person works at a warehouse putting boxes on shelves.
One day, rather than using a ladder they stand on a box to reach the top shelf. In the process of putting a box on the shelf,
they fall and injure their back. A strict liability claim requires the employee to prove the boxes caused his injury. Presumably,
this inquiry would ask whether it was foreseeable that a person would use the box as a step.
29that the nature of the work exposed her to risk regardless of the level of risk in the population, and (3)
positional risk test—the claimant must show that the injury would not have occurred but for the conditions
or obligations of the employment.119 There is a question whether the vaccination program “arises from
employment” regardless of the test a state adopts because the Vaccination Plan is voluntary. The Federal
and state governments are only beginning to answer these questions.
At the Federal level, the Department of Labor’s Oﬃce of Workers’ Compensation Plans (the “OWCP”)
announced the availability of workers’ compensation for smallpox vaccine injuries.120 In order to receive
compensation under FECA, a claimant must meet ﬁve requirements: (1) the claimant must ﬁle the claim
within three years of the injury, (2) the claimant must be a civil employee, (3) the injury must have resulted
from the incident claimed, (4) the injury must occur within the performance of duties, and (5) the injury
must be causally related to factors of employment.121 Additionally, the OWCP announcement instructs
claimants to provide medical evidence of the injury.122 While FECA provides compensation for injuries
from the vaccine, it does not compensate for voluntary absences from work. This distinction is important
because some ﬁrst responders have taken days oﬀ work to avoid infecting co-workers or patients. Under
these rules, FECA would not provide compensation for these absences.
In the case of secondary transmissions, FECA provides some coverage of the secondarily infected individual.
The announcement suggested that compensation may be available to unvaccinated workers who contract
vaccinia from a vaccinated co-worker. By omission this statement implies that some co-workers will be
unable to receive compensation. It also implies that non-Federal employees will be unable to recover for
injuries resulting from secondary transmissions from Federal employees.
119Id.
120Department of Labor Oﬃce of Workers’ Compensation, OWCP Guidance on Coverage for Smallpox Inoculations,(available
at http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/owcp/dfec smallpox policy.htm) [hereinafter OWCP Guidance]
121Department of Labor Oﬃce of Workers’ Compensation, General Provisions of the FECA
(available at http://nt5.scbbs.com/cgi-bin/om isapi.dll?clientID=469704&infobase=feca-pt2.nfo&jump=2-
0200&softpage=PL frame#JUMPDEST 2-0200).
122OWCP Guidance, supra note 120.
30The availability of workers’ compensation under state law is less clear. Generally, states fall into two cate-
gories. First, some states explicitly cover vaccine injuries. In hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on
Health, CDC Director Julie Gerberding testiﬁed that thirty-three states oﬀer some coverage through work-
ers’ compensation.123 For example, following President Bush’s public announcement in December, Ohio
quickly announced that the state’s workers compensation would cover vaccine-related injuries. Ohio’s Better
Worker’s Compensation (“BWC”) program covers injuries when (1) side eﬀects are more severe than normal,
(2) health care workers advise the individual to seek medical attention, or (3) illness causes the worker to
miss more than seven days of work.124 The program covers the cost of care and lost wages if the worker
misses more than seven days.125 Even though Ohio will compensate smallpox vaccine injuries, they have
decreased their estimates of demand for the vaccine.126 Other states only oﬀer partial coverage under their
workers’ compensation though many are working to provide comprehensive coverage.
Some states are currently uncertain whether their workers’ compensation covers vaccine injuries. For ex-
ample, the State of Wisconsin’s website has an FAQ stating that “[a]ny compensation must come through
worker’s compensation. DHFS is investigating what exactly is and is not covered by Wisconsin’s worker’s
compensation in regard to pre-event vaccination.”127 There are several potential reasons for this ambiguity.
First, some states are actively working to develop a compensation program. For example, state legislators in
Utah are currently trying to design a bill that allows workers to recoup medical expenses and lost wages.128
Second, some states are still trying to understand the application of their laws. Finally, one state has indi-
123Smallpox Hearings, supra note 67 (testimony of Dr. Julie Gerberding, Director, CDC)
124Ohio Better Workers’ Compensation, Fact Sheet: Workers’s Compensation Beneﬁts for the Smallpox Vaccine (available at
http://www.ohiobwc.com/downloads/brochureware/factsheets/PoxFactsheet.pdf).
125If the worker misses between seven and fourteen days, they are only allowed to recover lost wages for the number of days
missed beyond the seventh day. On the other hand, if the worker misses more than fourteen days, they can recover the wages
for the total number of days missed.
126Ferdinand & Connolly, supra note 20, at A12.
127Wisconsin Medical Society, Frequently Asked Questions about Pre-Event Smallpox Vaccination Plans available at
http://www.wisconsinmedicalsociety.org/physician resources/bioterrorism/dhfs smallpox faq.cfm (last visited on Jan-
uary 29, 2003).
128Noreen Gillespie, Slow Start to Smallpox Vaccines, The Desert News, Jan. 25, 2003, at A2.
31cated it will not cover the cost of medial treatment and lost income.129
In conclusion, federal employees can recover workers’ compensation for vaccine injuries but not for pre-
ventative reasons. Additionally, unvaccinated workers may be able to recover for secondary transmissions
from co-workers. At the state level, some states provide compensation, some states are uncertain and one
state does not provide compensation. As a result, workers’ compensation provides incomplete and variable
compensation for vaccine injuries.
C.
The Homeland Security Act
Shortly after the attacks on September 11, President Bush created an Oﬃce of Homeland Security to coordi-
nate the anti-terror campaign with other federal agencies.130 After formation of the non-cabinet level oﬃce,
a dispute between Congress and the White House erupted over the Head of Homeland Security’s accountabil-
ity to Congress.131 The White House position was that Mr. Ridge, the Head of Homeland Security, was a
presidential advisor who has no obligation to testify before Congress.132 Under increasing pressure, however,
President Bush proposed the creation of a Department of Homeland Security on June 6.133 On June 24, the
House introduced the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The centerpiece of the legislation was the merging of
22 government agencies into the cabinet-level department. The bill also contained other provisions including
the smallpox provision, HSA Section 304.
129See Smallpox Hearings, supra note 67 (testimony of Dr. Julie Gerberding, Director, CDC).
130See Elizabeth Becker and Elaine Sciolino, A Nation Challenged: Homeland Security; A New Federal Oﬃce Opens Amid
Concern that Its Head Won’t Have Enough Power, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 2001, at B11.
131See Elizabeth Becker, A Nation Challenged: Domestic Security; Bush is Said to Clear a New Security Department, N.Y.
Times, April 11, 2001, at A16.
132See Elizabeth Becker, A Nation Challenged: Big Visions for Security Post Shrink Amid Political Drama, N.Y. Times,
May 3, 2002, at A1.
133See Elisabeth Bumiller and David E. Sanger, Traces of Terror: The President; Bush as Terror Inquiry Swirls, Seeks
Cabinet Post on Security, N.Y. Times, June 7, 2002, at A1.
32HSA Section 304 gives the Secretary of HHS authority to issue a declaration that an emergency requires the
“administration of a covered countermeasure to a category or categories of individuals.”134 The statute also
gives the Secretary the authority to deﬁne the covered countermeasures and the eﬀective time period of such
measures.135
HSA Section 304 shields vaccine manufacturers from traditional tort claims brought by individuals receiving
the smallpox vaccine. The statute operates by deeming “covered persons” to be employees of the Public
Health Services (the “PHS”).136 The statute deﬁnes several “covered persons”: (1) vaccine manufacturers
and distributors,137 (2) the health care entities that provided the facilities,138 (3) the licensed health care
worker or other worker who is authorized to administer the vaccine139 and (4) any agent or employee of the
enumerated parties.140 Under the Public Health Services Act (the “PHSA”), individuals must ﬁle a claim
against the United States for injuries caused by an employee of the PHS when acting within the scope of
employment.141
As a result, under the HSA, injured parties cannot bring claims against any of these groups in either state
of federal court. A plaintiﬀ’s only recourse is to bring a claim against the United States. Under the PHSA,
these claims must be brought under the Federal Torts Claim Act (the “FTCA”), which only allows recovery
upon the showing of negligent or wrongful conduct.142 As a result, vaccine recipients who suﬀer adverse
reactions from the smallpox vaccine will receive compensation only if they prove negligence.
13442 U.S.C. §233(p)(2)(A)(i).
13542 U.S.C. §233(p)(2)(A)(ii) - (iii).
13642 U.S.C. §233(p)(1).
13742 U.S.C. §233(p)(7)(B)(i).
13842 U.S.C. §233(p)(7)(B)(ii).
13942 U.S.C. §233(p)(7)(B)(iii) and (7)(C).
14042 U.S.C. §233(p)(7)(B)(iv).
14142 U.S.C. §233(a).
14228 U.S.C. §1346(a). Before the passage of the FTCA, the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not allow lawsuits against
the United States. The justiﬁcation stems from early law that it would undermine the sovereignty of the king to permit suits
in his own court. Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch. 45A, at 394 (1979). The purpose of the Act is to provide compensation
when the conduct of government actors falls below socially acceptable levels. See generally Hughes v. U.S., 116 F. Supp. 2d
1145, (N.D. Cal. 2000).
33Finally, the United States is only liable if: (1) a qualiﬁed person administered the vaccine,143 (2) for an
acceptable purpose,144 (3) during the eﬀective period declared by the Secretary,145 (4) to an individual cov-
ered by the Secretary’s declaration or reasonably believed to be covered.146 As a result, the statute carefully
proscribes recovery for individuals who are not deemed by the Secretary to require vaccination.
There are several additional wrinkles. First, the statute requires the covered person to cooperate with the
United States in defending the case.147 The statutory protections are not available to the covered person
who fails to cooperate.148 Additionally, the United States can recover any damages paid and litigation costs
from a covered person who acted with gross negligence, recklessness or illegally.149
On the other hand, the statute does cover some individuals who were not vaccinated but were infected by a
vaccinated individual. There is a rebuttable presumption that the unintended party contracted vaccinia from
a vaccine recipient if one of three circumstances are met: (1) the individual contracts vaccinia during the
eﬀective period of the declaration,150 (2) the individual contracts vaccinia within thirty days of the eﬀective
period,151 or (3) the individual resides or has resided with a qualiﬁed person and contracted vaccinia.152
In his January 24 declaration, Secretary Thompson used his authority to extend the parameters of the vaccine
program. According to an aid of Secretary Thompson, the declaration tries to provide the widest possible
protection from liability.153 It achieves these ends by providing broad deﬁnitions to the statutory language.
There are three covered countermeasures: (1) the vaccinia vaccine,154 (2) cidoﬁvir and its derivatives,155
14342 U.S.C. §233(p)(2)(B)(i).
144Id.
145Id.
14642 U.S.C. §233(p)(2)(B)(ii)(I)-(II).
14742 U.S.C. §233(p)(5)(A).
14842 U.S.C. §233(p)(5)(B)(i) - (iii).
14942 U.S.C. §233(p)(6)(A).
15042 U.S.C. §233(p)(2)(c)(ii)(I).
15142 U.S.C. §233(p)(2)(c)(ii)(I).
15242 U.S.C. §233(p)(2)(c)(ii)(II).
153Laura Meckler, Laws Protect Those With Smallpox Vaccine, N.Y. Newday, Jan. 14, 2002, at A6.
154Declaration Regarding Administration of Smallpox Countermeasures, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4212.
155Id. Cidoﬁvir is a antiviral drug that has shown promise in treating individuals with smallpox. HDP-CDV is a derivative of
cidofovir that stops replication of the variola virus.
34and (3) vaccinia immune globulin.156 As a result, the statute will only exempt liability for the administra-
tion of these compounds. There are several classes of qualiﬁed persons: (1) a member of a state or local
smallpox response team, (2) public safety oﬃcers such as police oﬃcers, ﬁreﬁghters, and emergency medical
technicians, (3) certain overseas personnel.157 Additionally, Secretary Thompson broadened the deﬁnition
of “administration of covered countermeasure” to include ancillary support including education, screening
and monitoring.158 The eﬀective date runs from January 24, 2003 to January 24, 2004.159
While HSA Section 304 limits the liability of covered entities for adverse reactions, it does not foreclose the
recovery of workers’ compensation. HSA Section 304 forbids alternate state or federal claims within the
scope of the statute.160 This prevents potential victims from bringing traditional tort claims. Nevertheless,
workers’ compensation is not within the the preemptive sweep of HSA Section 304. As a result, injured
parties have the option of ﬁling negligence claims under HSA Section 304 or ﬁling for workers’ compensation
if it is available.
HSA Section 304 and Secretary Thompson’s declaration have several eﬀects. First, providers are reluctant
to vaccinate the general public because they are not “qualiﬁed persons.” Any adverse reaction would expose
the provider to potential liability. Indeed, the delay in vaccinating ﬁrst responders between President Bush’s
announcement and Secretary Thompson’s declaration was caused by the fear of an adverse event before there
was statutory protection. The second point is the breadth of HSA Section 304’s coverage. Secretary Thomp-
son’s declaration covers many activities besides inoculation and many items besides the vaccinia vaccine. In
conclusion, it is clear that the statute seeks to create an air-tight exemption when the provider administers
the vaccine within the statutory framework.
156Id.
157Declaration Regarding Administration of Smallpox Countermeasures, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4212.
158Id. at 4213.
159Id.
16042 U.S.C. §233(p)(3).
35D.
Conclusion
The current regimes create a patchwork that provides compensation for some injuries but not others. The
ﬁrst mechanism of compensation is the tort system. In the absence of HSA Section 304, injured parties
could bring common law tort claims against vaccine manufacturers and providers. Traditional theories of
liability would include negligence, strict liability, failure of the duty to warn, and breach of warranty. Some
of these theories would provide recovery without the need to prove negligence. HSA Section 304, however,
exempts covered manufacturers and providers from liability. Plaintiﬀs can only bring a claim against the
United States under the FTCA, which requires a showing of negligence. Those injured parties who would
have successful claims under traditional non-negligence theories would not be able to recover under HSA
Section 304.
Nevertheless, injured parties may be able to recover workers’ compensation–the second mechanism of com-
pensation. Workers’ compensation may be available under state or federal law. Employees of the federal
government can receive workers’ compensation for vaccine injuries. Additionally, federal employees secon-
darily infected by co-workers may also receive compensation. The availability of workers’ compensation for
non-federal employees depends on state law. After the announcement of the vaccine program, states scram-
bled to understand the coverage of their workers’ compensation programs. Currently, thirty-three states
oﬀer some compensation for vaccine injuries. Additionally, sixteen states are still undecided and one state
is not providing compensation.
While workers’ compensation provides a safety net for compensation, its coverage is incomplete for several
reasons. First, the scope of compensation coverage is vague. While some states have made their compensation
criteria available, other states have only indicated that compensation will be available to some individuals.
36Additionally, the federal government and many states do not compensate for all secondary transmissions. If
a policy goal is comprehensive compensation for vaccine injuries, then the current system clearly falls short.
The next four parts of this article discuss ways to implement a comprehensive system.
Part IV: The Swine Flu Act
A common complaint of HSA Section 304 is the need to prove negligence to receive compensation. Doctinally,
this provision eliminates some common law tort remedies by turning back the clock to a time between
MacPherson and the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Practically, it forecloses compensation for individuals
who suﬀer adverse reaction from a vaccine that was properly manufactured. An alternative regime could
shield manufacturers from liability but allow traditional common law tort claims against the United States.
The approach would allow the same recovery that is available under the common law without exposing
manufacturers to excessive litigation.
In a program to vaccinate the U.S. population against an anticipated outbreak of an especially virulent
form of the ﬂu, Congress passed the Swine Flu Act that adopted a similar liability scheme. These liability
provisions are historically important because adverse reactions to the vaccine created extensive litigation
until the mid-80’s. This section analyzes the Swine Flu Act and draws lessons from its application. The ﬁrst
part of the section provides the historical context of the act. While the second part outlines the statutory
operation, the third part discusses its application in litigation. Finally, the fourth part draws lessons from
the Swine Flu Act that are applicable to forming a current regime.
A.
37Background
In early January 1976, many Army recruits at Fort Dix suﬀered serious respiratory ailments. In fact,
the Army hospitalized several recruits and one recruit died after an overnight hike in the January cold.
Responding to the outbreak, Army doctors sent cultures to the New Jersey state lab with the results
indicating the presence of common inﬂuenza virus. Four samples, however, revealed the presence of the
swine ﬂu virus.161
This result alarmed Army doctors because the swine ﬂu virus caused the Inﬂuenza Pandemic of 1918. Perhaps
the most virulent disease in modern times, the Inﬂuenza Pandemic of 1918 killed more than 20 million people
worldwide including over 500,000 people from the United States.162 Individuals either died from bacterial
pneumonia or other complications. Though the availability of antibiotics would have reduced the mortality
rate from an outbreak in 1976, swine ﬂu could still have been devastating.163 Doctors had not seen this
strain of the ﬂu in humans since a decade after the epidemic. As a result, only older individuals have natural
immunities from previous exposure.164 Additionally, the swine ﬂu’s devastating eﬀects on young, healthy
individuals in 1918 compounded the potential problem.165
Naturally the doctors at Fort Dix alerted the CDC of their ﬁndings. The CDC held a press conference on
February 19 to preempt any leaks but the New York Times ran front-page article the next day announcing
the return of the most lethal virus of modern medicine.166 The CDC presented their ﬁndings to ACIP. On
March 13, ACIP ﬁnalized a memorandum of possible approaches to the problem.167 The ﬁrst approach was
161Richard E. Neustadt & Harvey V. Fineberg, The Swine Flu Affair; Decision Making on a Slippery Slope (1980).
162Id.
163Id.
164Id.
165Id.
166Harold Schmeck, U.S. Calls Flu Alert on Possible Return of Epidemic Virus, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1976, at A1.
167Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to James F. Dickinson
(March 18, 1976). (on ﬁle with author).
38to do nothing. The committee listed the potential action by the private industry and the possibility of no
pandemic as beneﬁts to this approach.168 On the other hand, ACIP noted that action would be expected
and that Congress would act in the absence of CDC action.169
The second approach was phrased the “minimum response” approach.170 This would entail the federal gov-
ernment advising the private drug industry and starting a public awareness campaign. The beneﬁt of the
approach was that it was a high visibility and low eﬀort endeavor that would be relatively inexpensive. The
drawbacks were two-fold. First, there was the concern that the private drug industry would not have the
proper incentives to respond. Second, there was a concern that the vaccine would not reach certain segments
of the population such as the poor, the near poor, and the elderly.
The third approach was called the “Government Program” approach.171 In this approach, the Federal gov-
ernment would advise vaccine manufacturers to start full scale production of 200 million doses of vaccine.
The CDC would purchase the vaccine from the manufacturers and distribute the vaccine to the State Health
Departments. The State Health Departments would try to immunize one hundred percent of the population.
Additionally, the federal government would conduct extensive outreach programs to increase awareness. The
advantages of the approach was that there would be maximum production of vaccine and the most equitable
distribution throughout the population. Additionally, it would assure uniform distribution while still allow-
ing the states to perform a typical state function. The drawbacks were that the system would be costly,
ineﬃcient, and may not work as intended.
The ﬁnal approach was called the “Combined Approach.”172 The federal government would advise the vac-
cine manufacturers to make 200 million doses available to the states. In turn, state oﬃcials would develop
168Id.
169Id.
170Id.
171Id.
172Id.
39plans to immunize people in their states with the federal government would provide outreach and educa-
tional programs. This program oﬀered many of the Government Program advantages but increased the state
involvement. At the end of their memorandum, ACIP recommended this approach to the immunization
program.
On March 24, President Ford convened a panel of experts to discuss the possibility of a vaccine program.
Both Jonas Salk and Albert Sabin were present at the meeting. By several accounts, everyone voted for
the vaccination program though several participants later expressed reservations.173 Concerned about leaks
to the press, Ford announced the vaccination plans immediately following the meeting. Within one month,
Congress responded by adding the program to a pending appropriations bill.
While manufacturers began producing the vaccine, the issue of liability threatened to delay the whole pro-
cess. In late May, one manufacturer ended negotiations with the government when they were unable to
receive indemniﬁcation for any legal costs resulting from the program.174 Following the Reyes decision in
1974, liability exposure increasingly concerned vaccine manufacturers. In addition to the cost of any awards,
the cost of defending all lawsuits concerned the manufacturers’ insurers. In early April, Merck’s primary
insurer informed the company that coverage for the swine ﬂu was not possible.175
The vaccine manufacturers met some resistance from Congress.176 It was the beginning of August and there
were no additional reports of the Swine Flu. With no signs of a pending epidemic, some members of Congress
questioned the wisdom of the program. However, an outbreak of a new respiratory illness in Pennsylvania
accelerated the passage of legislation and the inoculations started on October 1, 1976. 177
173Neustadt & Fineberg, supra note 161
174Id. at 48.
175Id. at 54.
176See, e.g., House of Representatives, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Subcommittee on Health and Environ-
ment, Supplemental Hearings, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, Serial No. 94-113, June 28, 1976, p. 19. For example, Representative
Henry Waxman stated “...the insurance industry is not acting responsibly when they are asking to charge three or four times
the usual rate for a vaccine that does not oﬀer signiﬁcant risk, while at the same time they are insuring vaccination programs
where there are more substantial risks involved.” Id. at 19,
177These cases were at the American Legion State Convention resulting in the name Legionnaire’s Disease. Neustadt &
Fineberg, supra note 161
40As part of the vaccination program, the CDC monitored the public health. By early December, it was clear
that there was an elevated risk of Guillain-Barr Syndrome (GBS) in vaccinated individuals.178 GBS is a
paralytic disease caused by the immune system attacking peripheral nerves. In acute cases, it has a 25%
mortality rate. On December 16, 1976, the program was terminated after the inoculation of over forty million
people. Just three months after Congress established a liability system for vaccine injuries, it was clear that
the provisions were going to be used.
B.
Statutory Operation
Congress identiﬁed three purposes when they passed the Swine Flu Act: (1) to protect individuals who
manufacture, distribute, or administer the swine ﬂu vaccine for liability other than their negligence (2)
to establish an orderly procedure for claims arising from injury or death and (3) to meet any potential
emergency by establishing a permanent approach to handling claims.179
The Swine Flu Act operated in two ways. First, it exempted participating parties from tort claims. The
statute deemed manufacturers, distributors, health care entities and health care professional meeting certain
criteria to be participating parties.180 The Swine Flu Act was the exclusive remedy against parties deemed
“program participants” so that the Act also preempted any state cause of action.181 Second the statute
allowed an individual to bring a claim against the United States under the FTCA using traditional common
178During the surveillance time, there were ﬁfty-eight deaths. Additionally, there were over two hundred adverse reactions
attributable to the disease. Overall, the risk of an adverse reaction was estimated at one in 100,000 vaccinations. Id.
179Id.
180National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113 (1976). [hereinafter Swine Flu Act]
181Program participants are the manufacturers, distributors, organization providing inoculation, and health care workers. The
organizations must not charge for the vaccine and must comply with an informed consent form and a procedures form. The
health care workers must also comply with the informed consent form. Id.
41law theories such as negligence, strict liability, or breach of warranty.182 This provision relaxed the mens
rea requirement of a traditional FTCA cause of action. When an individual brought a claim, the law of the
location of the act or omission governed the choice of law.183 Further, claims would only be adjudicated in
federal court because the statute mandated removal of state claims to federal court.
The statute charged the Attorney General with defending any claims. It also created an incentive for pro-
gram participants to assist the Attorney General. In order to remain a program participant, the party must
cooperate with the United States in defending against the claim. Finally, the United States had a right of
contribution against any program participant who acted negligently. This right allowed the United States
to receive compensation for the damages paid to injury victims.
C.
Results
By early 1977, there were many claims against the United States under the Swine Flu Act. The Judicial
Panel on Multi-District Litigation (JPML) ordered the litigation to be consolidated for pre-trial discovery in
the D.C. Circuit.184 On June 20, 1978, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
stated that plaintiﬀs did not need to prove negligence in order to recover under the Swine Flu Program.
Rather, plaintiﬀs only needed to show that they developed GBS as a result of the swine ﬂu vaccination and
suﬀered the alleged damages.185
Aside from GBS, there were reports of other side eﬀects believed to be caused by the vaccine. By only
applying the policy to GBS, the Secretary’s announcement created several tiers of litigation. For individuals
182Swine Flu Act, supra note 180.
183Id.
184See In re Swine Flu Immunization Products Liability Litigation, 446 F.Supp. 244 (JPML) (upholding the order to consol-
idate discovery in the District of the District of Columbia).
185See In re Swine Flu Immunization Products Liability Litigation, 464 F.Supp. 949 (JPML)
42suﬀering GBS, it was easier to recover damages. The government established an approach of settling some
cases and ﬁghting others. Indivduals experiencing the onset of GBS within ﬁve weeks of vaccination were
virtually guaranteed recovery.186 Similarly, onset within ten weeks also had a high chance of recovery.
The other tier of litigants was individuals who did not suﬀer GBS but suﬀered other diseases. The Secre-
tary’s declaration did not apply to them. Instead they needed to rely on common law doctrines to recover
damages. Some plaintiﬀs were able to recover by presenting evidence showing that their illness was within
the “family” of GBS.187 Other courts held that some conditions were reasonably foreseeable and that the
generic warnings by the United States failed to disclose these conditions. Some courts permitted recovery
under a negligence theory for the government’s failure to exercise reasonable care in providing the warn-
ings.188 Other courts found that the inadequate warnings rendered the products unreasonably dangerous
resulting in strict liability.189 Though there were some successes, many cases that went to trial resulted
in no recovery. Many of these cases involved conditions less clearly associated with the swine ﬂu vaccine.
On the other hand, some courts denied recovery for failure to warn of conditions that other courts found
material.190 In the end, the Swine Flu Act litigation was very long and costly.
D.
Conclusion
Clearly, the Swine Flu Act allowed more recovery than HSA Section 304. While the more expansive scope
186Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federal Compensation for Vaccination Induced Injuries, 13 B.C. Envtl. Aﬀ. L. Rev. 169, 184
(1986).
187See Unthank v. U.S., 732 F.2d 1517 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding the United States liable for injuries caused by transverse
myelitis because it fell in the broader category of GBS).
188See Gassman v. U.S., 589 F. Supp. 1534 (M.D. Fla. 1984) (holding the United States liable for negligently failing to
mention the risk of neurological injuries resulting from the vaccine).
189See Petty v. U.S., 740 F.2d 1428 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding the United States derivatively liable under a strict liability
theory for an unreasonably dangerous product).
190See Saxe v. U.S., 577 F. Supp. 135 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (ﬁnding no duty to disclose information about contracting neurological
disorders because they rarely occurred in the general population).
43made recovery easier, it did not eliminate every impediment to recovery. As some of the cases highlight, the
most diﬃcult hurdle for plaintiﬀs to clear was proving causation. Certainly, the Secretary’s announcement
that recovery would be available for individuals suﬀering from GBS made recovery easier for these individuals.
More speciﬁcally, the government’s temporal test for causation assured a quick settlement. For cases that
did not settle, litigation was protracted, expensive and uncertain.
Part V: The National Childhood Vaccine Act
In products liability cases involving drugs or vaccines, causation is often the most diﬃcult aspect. It is fact-
speciﬁc and relies on a signiﬁcant amount of evidence. While the implementation of the Swine Flu Act lowered
the threshold requirements for some individuals, the United States informally applied it. Another approach
to a compensation program would be to create a more formal time and symptom-based determination of
causation.
One can imagine developing a schedule to facilitate the showing of causation. On one axis would be common
symptoms from known adverse reactions. On the other axis would be the amount of time since vaccination
that the symptoms occurred. Individuals who developed a listed symptom within the speciﬁed time would
be able to recover damages on the presumption that the vaccine caused the injuries.
There is historical precedent for such a regime. Responding to a crisis in vaccine manufacturing and pricing,
Congress passed the NCVIA in 1986. The centerpiece of the legislation is a no-fault compensation system
based on a table of injuries. Individuals who suﬀer a “table injury” within the speciﬁed time can recover
damages from the United States. This Part explores the NCVIA. The ﬁrst section provides the historical
context for the passage of the NCVIA. The second section describes its operation and the third section
discusses the practical application of the NCVIA.
44A. Background
The late 70’s and early 80’s were ripe for the development of a vaccine compensation system. The state
vaccination programs were an enormous success with disease rates at all-time lows.191 Several estimates
suggested that the success of the vaccine programs saved several billion dollars in health care costs. Addi-
tionally, the worldwide eradication of smallpox was recently completed. Despite the successes, these were
diﬃcult times for vaccine manufacturers. The evolution of the common law tort doctrines gave individuals
an array of theories for pursuing damages. Additionally, parents became more aware of vaccine injuries and
mobilized eﬀort to address the issue. The increased awareness further fueled litigation.
By any measure, the eﬀects devastated the vaccine industry. From 1983 to 1985, the price of the polio vaccine
increased 140 percent and the price of DPT increased 230 percent.192 The extra money was not going in the
manufacturers’ pockets. For example, in 1983, the amount of liability claims against the DPT manufacturer
Lederle exceeded their sales by 200 times.193 Facing the uncertainty of the claims, many manufacturers were
having diﬃculty buying liability insurance.194 As a result many manufacturers stopped producing vaccines.
By 1985, there was only one manufacturer of polio vaccine, one manufacturer of measles, mumps and rubella
(MMR) vaccine, and two manufacturers of the DPT vaccine.195 Many government oﬃcials viewed these
developments as threatening the earlier successes.
Though plaintiﬀs’ claims were increasingly successful, there was concern about the adequacy of the tort
system as a compensation mechanism. While some plaintiﬀs won huge awards from the vaccine manufac-
turers, many deserving plaintiﬀs were shut out. Often the ability of plaintiﬀs to recover depended on the
jurisdiction of the lawsuit. Some states determined that vaccines were unavoidably unsafe as a matter of
191See S. Rep. No. 99-483, at 3 (1986).
192See H.R. Rep. No. 99-801 (1986).
193See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1985: Hearings Before the Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, 99th Cong. 229 (1985).
194See H.R. Rep. No. 99-908 (1986).
195Id. at 5.
45law and did not permit design defect claims.196 Additionally, many courts held that proximate cause could
not be proven for duty to warn cases when the vaccine was state-mandated. Defendants based this clever
defense on the reality that better disclosures would not change a decision to vaccinate when it was required
to attend school. Even for plaintiﬀs who prevailed, the litigation process was often very timely and costly.
As with many medical cases, there was signiﬁcant complexity to the science and the facts surrounding an
individual case.
During the early 1980’s, the public became aware of the dangers of childhood vaccinations. A 1985 report by
the American Medical Association estimated that sixty-three American children suﬀered from severe brain
injury or death every year.197 There were also highly publicized news programs including NBC’s “Today”
show and ABC’s “Nightline.”198 As a result of the increased publicity, parents of injured children formed
the “Dissatisﬁed Parents Together” group. This group soon allied itself with the American Academy of
Pediatrics (the “AAP”). Since the late 70’s, the AAP supported the idea of a no-fault compensation system
for childhood vaccine injuries.199 They crafted their position after several existing international programs.
Though each group sought a no-fault system, they disagreed over its administration. The AAP wanted an
expert group within the HHS to administer the program.200 On the other hand, the parents did not want
authority in the hands of bureaucrats or medical experts.201 Ultimately, the groups agreed to have a special
master within the federal court system administer the program. In November 1983, Senator Paula Hawkins
of Florida introduced the bill into Congress. The next June, Representative Henry Waxman of California
introduced a companion measure in the House.
196See, e.g., Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318 (Kan. 1986) (holding that the Sabin polio vaccine was
unavoidably unsafe as a matter of law).
197American Medical Association Board of Trustees, Report of Ad Hoc Commission on Vaccine Injury Compensation, Conn.
Med., March 1985, at 172.
198See Francesca Lunzero, Scared Shotless, Forbes at 256 (1985).
199Thomas Frederick Burke, Litigation and Its Discontents : The Politics of Adverserial Legalism 292 (1996) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of California Berkley) (on ﬁle with author)
200Burke, supra note 199, at 296.
201Id.
46The bills met stiﬀ resistance from various sources. The Reagan Administration was highly skeptical of a
no-fault compensation system. Instead, they proposed to eliminate punitive damages and a cap on pain and
suﬀering at $100,000.202 Obviously, vaccine manufacturers also resisted the compensation system. Instead,
they supported a bill by Illinois Representative Edward Madigan that would create regional panels to arbi-
trate claims. Manufacturers would pay awards up to a $1 million cap. Parents had the option of rejecting
arbitration and bringing a traditional claim that would also be capped.203 Alternatively they could not bring
an arbitration claim and bring a tort claim with uncapped liabilities.
Attempting to reach a compromise, Representative Waxman introduced a new bill that provided several
safeguards for manufacturers if parents chose to bring a tort claim.204 Now facing strong opposition from
DPT and other parent organizations, Waxman ﬁddled with the liability provisions. Afraid that President
Reagan would veto the bill, Waxman included the bill as part of a health care omnibus provision. After
Congress passed the bill, President Reagan signed it into law with much reluctance.
B. Statutory Operation
The NCVIA establishes a no-fault compensation for certain vaccines including the measles, mumps, rubella
vaccine (the “MMR vaccine”), pertussis vaccines, diptheria vaccines, tetanus vaccines, and polio vaccines.205
Special masters appointed by the United States Court of Federal Claims (the “Federal Claims court”) preside
over the claims proceedings.206 The Federal Claims court has appellate jurisdiction over special masters de-
cisions and reviews under an arbitrary and capricious standard.207 The NCVIA enables the Federal Claims
202Id. at 301.
203Id. at 303.
204The bill only permitted parents to ﬁle a civil claim after they brought a claim before the panel. The bill also eliminated
the common theories of failure of the duty to warn and strict liability. Finally, claimants could not recover punitive damages.
Id.
20542 U.S.C. §300aa-14(a).
20642 U.S.C. §300aa-12(c)(1).
20742 U.S.C. §300aa-12.
47court to promulgate rules for the special master. The statute stresses that the rules should provide a less-
adversarial, quicker, and more informal proceeding than normal claims in federal court.208
In order to bring a claim, the claimant must show that: (1) they received a vaccine set forth in the Vaccine
Injury Table,209 (2) they received the vaccine in the United States,210 (3) the vaccine caused the injury,211
(4) they suﬀered the injury for more than six months,212 and (5) they have not previously collected an award
or settlement.213 In proving causation there are three possibilities. If the claimant suﬀered an injury set
forth in the Vaccine Injury Table (or “Table injury”) within the speciﬁed time then there is a presumption
of causation.214 On the other hand, if the claimant suﬀered a Table injury after the time speciﬁed than they
must show traditional causation-in-fact.215 Similarly, if the claimant suﬀered a non-Table injury then they
must also show causation-in-fact.216 The statute authorizes compensation when the claimant demonstrates
these elements by a preponderance of the evidence and the government fail to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the injury was due to other factors.217
The Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund pays the compensation to the successful claimant.218 It is
funded by a seventy-ﬁve cent surcharge on every childhood vaccine.219 The statute instructs the special mas-
ter to determine compensation amounts based on medical expenses, lost earnings and pain and suﬀering.220
It does not allow the payment of punitive damages.221 The statute gives the special master discretion to
determine whether it is a lump sum payment or an annuity.222
20842 U.S.C. §300aa-12(d)(2).
20942 U.S.C. §300aa-11(c)(1)(A).
21042 U.S.C. §300aa-11(c)(1)(B)(i)(I).
21142 U.S.C. §300aa-11(c)(1)(C).
21242 U.S.C. §300aa-11(c)(1)(D).
21342 U.S.C. §300aa-11(c)(1)(E).
21442 U.S.C. §300aa-11(c)(1)(c)(i).
21542 U.S.C. §300aa-11(c)(1)(c)(ii)(I).
21642 U.S.C. §300aa-11(c)(1)(c)(ii)(II).
21742 U.S.C. §300aa-13(a)(1).
21842 U.S.C. §300aa-15(f)(4).
21926 U.S.C. §4131(b)(1)(a).
220See 42 U.S.C. §300aa-15(a)(1)-(3).
22142 U.S.C. §300aa-15(d)(1).
222Id. The statute requires that the special master base compensation on the present value of the payment. Courts have
48The statute mandates that successful claimants receive compensation for past and future medical expenses.
It requires that the expense (1) result from the vaccine injury (2) incurred by the person suﬀering the injury
and (3) be incurred for diagnosis, treatment, or aftercare.223 In addition, the claimant must not receive
reimbursement for expenses covered by other sources. There is signiﬁcant litigation concerning whether
claimed expenses are proper expenses for rehabilitation, vocational training and counseling.224 Finally, the
statute authorizes the payment of $250,000 for death.225
The statute permits the recovery of lost wages. For claimants sustaining injuries after their eighteenth
birthday, the statute mandates determination of actual and anticipated lost earnings based on actuarial
principles.226 For claimants sustaining injuries before their eighteenth birthday, lost wages is determined by
subtracting taxes and average health insurance from the average wage of a private, non-farm sector wage
earner.227 The special master does not take other factors such as education, professional level, or fringe
beneﬁts into account.228
The statute permits compensation for pain and suﬀering up to $250,000.229 It mandates the special master
to discount awards for future pain and suﬀering to present value.230 The courts are generally unreceptive
to the arguments that severely debilitated children should not receive pain and suﬀering damages because
they are physically unable to experience pain.231
interpreted this statutory language to require the special master to not to adjust annuity payments for the time-value of money.
As a result, payment of compensation through an annuity eﬀectively reduces the amount received.
22342 U.S.C. §300aa-15(a)(1)(A).
224See, e.g., Kleinhart v. Secretary of HHS, 25 Cl. Ct. 173 (upholding compensation for family counseling to help deal
with child’s behavioral diﬃculties); Stotts v. Secretary of HHS 23 Cl Ct 352 (1991) (upholding an award of $48,626.05 for
architectural modiﬁcations to the family home to allow the child to remain).
22542 U.S.C. §300aa-15(a)(2).
22642 U.S.C. §300aa-15(a)(3)(A).
22742 U.S.C. §300aa-15(a)(3)(B).
228See Edgar on behalf of Edgar v. HHS, 26 Cl. Ct. 286 (Fed. Cl. 1992) (reasoning that to allow these considerations would
eliminate the distinction between subsection (A) and subsection (B) of 42 U.S.C. §300aa-15(a)(3)).
22942 U.S.C. §300aa-15(a)(4).
23042 U.S.C. §300aa-15(f)(4). In calculating the amount of compensation, courts have held that pain and suﬀering damages
should be determined up to the cap and then discounted to present value. See, e.g.,Youngblood v. Secretary of HHS, 32 F.3d
552 (Fed Cir., 1994) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that the statute capped the present value of compensation at $250,000).
231See, e.g., Edgar on behalf of Edgar v. Secretary of HHS, 26 Cl. Ct. 286 (Fed. Cl. 1992) (holding that parents of a child
in a permanent vegetative coma could recover damages for pain and suﬀering).
49The second part of the NCVIA allows plaintiﬀs to reject the results of the VICP and bring a state claim.
Nevertheless, provisions of the NCVIA change the substantive contours of a state claim. First, the statute
adopts Section 402A comment k of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. A vaccine manufacturer will not be
held liable for unavoidable side eﬀects if the vaccine was properly prepared and accompanied by warnings.232
Second, the statute creates a presumption of adequate warnings if they comply with Food and Drug Admin-
istration standards.233 A plaintiﬀ can overcome the presumption if they prove either (1) the manufacturer
failed to exercise due care notwithstanding compliance234 or (2) the manufacturer engaged in fraudulent or
intentional withholding of information.235 Finally, the statute states that manufacturers does not need to
provide the warning to the individual. Some commentators call this provision a codiﬁcation of the learned
intermediary doctrine because the manufacturer discharges his duty when it supplies information to the
doctor.
C. Results
The NCVIA accomplished several of its legislative purposes. One purpose was to stabilize the supply of
vaccines so that more children receive vaccines. To this end, wholesale vaccine prices have decreased and
childhood immunization rates have increased.236 Additionally, vaccine manufacturers are thriving with de-
creased pressures from litigation. No vaccine manufacturers have left the market and new innovations are
starting to reach the market.237
Another goal of the NCVIA was to lower the burden on claimants to receive compensation for their injuries.
In achieving this purpose, the NCVIA has had mixed results. One positive result is that the average time
23242 U.S.C. §300aa-22(b)(1).
23342 U.S.C. §300aa-22(b)(2).
23442 U.S.C. §300aa-22(b)(2)(B).
23542 U.S.C. §300aa-22(b)(2)(A) and 42 U.S.C. §300aa-23(d)(2)(A).
236Derry Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 24 J.
Health Pol. Pol’y L. 59, 62 (1999).
237Id. One recent cause for concern was the increased litigation over thiomerosal, a mercury-based additive to the DPT
vaccine. As a last second rider to the HSA, Congress included thiomerosal in the NCVIA.
50for claim determination has decreased to 20.3 months.238 However, the correctness of claim determinations
is subject to dispute. One study reviewed every published eligibility decision since 1999 and found that
51.9% of claims led to awards.239 Rather than reviewing published decisions, other commentators cite the
raw statistics as demonstrating that the VICP only compensates one third of the claims suggesting that
the VICP did not provide enough compensation.240 Certainly, it is diﬃcult to judge the eﬀectiveness of the
system without knowing the true number of injuries.
In published decisions, the majority of the denied claims were because of lack of causation.241 Clearly, an
advantage of the VICP is the availability of table causation. Only ﬁve percent of successful claims were
non-table cases. The diﬃculty for claimants in these non-table cases is that they must establish causation-
in-fact. This burden is diﬃcult to meet because it is a fact-speciﬁc and scientiﬁc inquiry.
While the NCVIA has been a structural success, the biggest complaints have been directed at the adminis-
tration. One problem is that awards vary greatly depending on the special master and the attorneys in the
case. A recent study showed that success rates of claimants varied between 32.8 and 65.8 percent depending
on the special master.242 Additionally, success rates varied from 37.9 and 72 percent depending on the
claimant’s attorney.243 Both results are statistically signiﬁcant and appear to contradict the NCVIA’s goal
of uniformity and certainty.
The biggest problem is the increasingly adversarial posture of the Department of Justice attorneys in de-
fending against the claims. One purpose of the VICP was to provide faster and less adversarial adjudication
of injury claims. In a recent report, the House Committee on Government Reform stated “the program
under the direction of the HHS has approved changes that substantially restrict compensation coverage.
238Ridgway, supra note 236 at 64.
239Id.
240See Elizabeth C. Scott, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Turns Fifteen, 56 Food Drug L.J. 351 (2001).
241Ridgway, supra note 236, at 65.
242Id. at 66.
243Id.
51Furthermore, avoidable, protracted and adversarial litigation of claims has resulted thereby undermining the
remedial nature of the program as intended by Congress.”244 As earlier stated, the average processing time
is lower than litigation. Nevertheless, this number is misleading. Many claims, especially table claims, are
handled quickly while non-table claims are not.245 Only fourteen percent of claims have been handled within
one year and nineteen percent have been handled within one to two years.246
The cause of the delay is subject to dispute. The DOJ claims petitioners take a long time responding to
requests for additional information. Data collected by the HHS shows that the special master requested
additional medical information from half of the petitioners.247 Most petitioners took over a year to supply
this information.248
On the other hand, many individuals claim that the adversarial nature of the DOJ prolongs the claim pro-
cess. Before 1990, the special masters handled over ninety percent of the claims within two years. In 1990,
however, the HHS and DOJ began to increasingly review the validity of the claims. The HHS began a
program that used expert witnesses to scrutinize the causation of the injuries by trying to determine other
causes including pre-existing seizure disorders.249 Additionally, the DOJ began to designate attorneys to
specialize in handling the vaccine cases. After 1990, the number of claims handled within two years hovers
around thirty percent.250
Other evidence also points to the increasingly adversarial role of the DOJ attorneys. In the case of Marks
v. Sec’y of HHS, the special master said:
244H.R. Rpt. 106-977 2 Oct. 12, 2000 at 2.
245See id. at 12 (citing statements by the special master that “whether cases proceed under the Table or as causation-in-fact
cases correlates directly to the amount of time, the number of issues presented, and the cost of processing cases.”)
246United States General Accounting Oﬃce, Vaccine Injury Compensation: Program Challenged to Settle Claims Quickly and
Easily at pg. 8. [hereinafter GAO Report]
247Id.
248Id. at 9.
249Id. at 10.
250See GAO Report, supra note 246, at 11.
52[C]ounsel’s abrasive, tenacious, obstreperous litigation tactics were inappropriate in a pro-
gram that is intended to be less adversarial; and hindered greatly a fair, expeditious res-
olution to the case. In addition, simply lacks tact and compassion. Quite frankly, the
special master is embarrassed that respondent’s counsel and resondent’s life care planner
represented the United States government in this case.251
In addition to an adversarial tone, critics point to several other aggressive tactics. First, the DOJ attorneys
vigorously use tactics to impeach expert testimony. Second, they substitute one expert for another if they
disagree with the opinion of the ﬁrst expert. Finally, the repeat many arguments at the damages hearing
that may have failed at the entitlement phase.252
In conclusion, the NCVIA has shortened the claim process and added simplicity to compensation claims.
Nevertheless, there is substantial criticism that the practical implementation of the VICP does not fully
achieve the Congressional purpose. Certainly any proposal for a smallpox vaccine compensation system
bases upon the NCVIA should address these concerns.
D. Conclusion
By providing table causation, the NCVIA has simpliﬁed and expedited the claims process for childhood
vaccine injuries. Nevertheless, there is some dispute whether it has been successful in allowing recovery
for every vaccine injury. The creation of an Oﬃce of Special Masters within the Court of Federal Claims
established an infrastructure that allows claims to be heard by individuals with specialized expertise. While
the mechanisms should expedite claim determinations, recent criticisms suggest that the claims process is
taking too long. This complaint has been the focus of Congressional scrutiny and may result in amendments
to the NCVIA.
252See id. at 12.
53Part VI: 9/11 Victim’s Compensation Fund
Both the Swine Flu Act and the NCVIA were compensation programs established over twenty years ago.
The 9/11 VCF is a more recent compensation program that has been the subject of extensive criticism.
Nevertheless, it is important to study in order to learn lessons for future programs. The ﬁrst section reviews
the history surrounding the passage of the 9/11 VCF. The second section discusses the operation of the
compensation program. Finally, the last section reviews the implementation of the program.
A. Background
Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, there was considerable concern about the ﬁnancial sta-
bility of the airline industry. Already strapped for cash, the industry lost an estimated $100 to $275 million
dollars each day that the federal government grounded ﬂights.253 Once ﬂights resumed, the number of pas-
sengers was much lower than normal. Additionally, United Airlines and American Airlines faced potential
lawsuit from victims and their families.
Almost immediately after the events on September 11, the White House began circulating a two-pronged
proposal to bailout the airline industry. First, it would make $10 billion in loans and $5 billion in cash
available to the airline industry.254 Second, it would make the Southern District of New York the exclusive
forum for a Federal cause of action against the air carrier. Additionally, it would limit the liability to the
extent of the insurance coverage maintained by the air carrier. Only ten days after September 11, Congress
passed these provisions in the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (the “ATSSA”).255
ATSSA, however, contained a third provision written hours before its passage as a result of extensive par-
tisan negotiation.256 This provision established a no-fault compensation system for victims of the events of
253Laurence Zuckerman, After the Attacks: Financial Struggle; Airlines, in Search of Relief, Warn of Bankruptcy, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 15, 2001, at A1.
254Id.
255See 49 U.S.C. §40101.
256Diana B. Henriques and David Barstow, A Nation Challenged: Victim’s Compensation; Fund for Victims’ Families Already
54September 11. Its history began two days before the passage of ATSSA, when lobbyists for the American
Trial Lawyers Association ﬂoated the idea of a compensation fund for victims. Senate Majority Leader Tom
Daschle and House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt soon made it clear to other members of Congress
that they would not support airline relief without the establishment of a compensation fund. The White
House had already proposed a plan to consolidate all litigation in the Southern District of New York. In
this plan, plaintiﬀs would have to prove negligence and the federal government would pay for any damages
exceeding the insurance coverage. Democrats were now pushing their plan in its place.
Many Republicans resisted the Democrats’ plan because it did not cap liability.257 Additionally, Senator
Don Nickles of Oklahoma expressed concern about the fairness to victims of other terrorist attacks such as
the Oklahoma City bombing.258 In a twenty-four ﬂurry before the passage of ATSSA, Congress ﬁnalized the
details of the 9/11 VCF. In return for no limitations on compensation, Democrats agreed to two conditions.
First, any compensation award would be oﬀset by money received from other sources such as insurance.
Second, the Attorney General would appoint the special master.259
On November 26, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft chose Kennth Feinberg as special master. During
the initial stages of the selection process, former Senators John Danforth of Missouri and George Mitchell
of Maine were mentioned as possible candidates.260 Mr. Feinberg, however, expressed interest to Senator
Charles Hagel of Nebraska and also received support from New York Senator Charles Schumer. An unusual
nominee for a Republican administration, Mr. Feinberg was a practicing lawyer and former chief of staﬀ
for Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy. He distinguished himself as a negotiator in some of the most
famous mass-tort cases: Agent Orange, DES, Dalkon Shield, and breast implants. Indeed some of the qual-
Proves Sore Point, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 2001, at A1.
257Id. Responding to concerns about the cost of the fund, Senator Daschle responded “Do you want to put a value on human
life right now? I don’t.” Id.
258Id.
259Id. In their initial proposal, Democrats wanted a senior judge approved by the Senate to act as special master of the fund.
260Elizabeth Kolbert, The Calculator: How Kenneth Feinberg Determines the Value of Three Thousand Lives, The New
Yorker, Nov. 25, 2002, 42.
55ities that make him excel in this ﬁeld also lead him to clash with claimants. Nevertheless, he was given the
broad discretion to operate the fund.
B. Operation
The stated pupose of the 9/11 VCF is to “provide compensation to any individual (or relatives of a deceased
individual) who was physically injured or killed as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of Septem-
ber 11, 2001.”261 The 9/11 VCF gives the attorney general the power to appoint a special master who
administers the compensation program and promulgates all procedural and substantive rules.262 It allows
individuals injured in the crashes or the personal representatives of individuals killed to ﬁle a claim with the
special master.263
For an individual to be eligible, they must satisfy the presence and physical harm requirements. To satisfy
the presence requirement, the person must have been at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, or the
Shanksville, Pennsylvania crash site at the time of the crash or in the immediate aftermath.264 The ﬁnal
regulations deﬁne the “immediate aftermath” as ninety-six hours for rescue workers and twelve hours for
everyone else.265
The ﬁnal regulations also set a temporal limit on the physical harm requirement. A medical professional
must have treated the injury within twenty-four hours of the injury or the individual’s rescue.266 For those
who did not realize the extent of their injuries or could not obtain medical care, the time limit is seventy-two
hours.267 For rescue workers who could not obtain medical care within seventy-two hours, the regulation
gives the special master discretion to choose the appropriate limit.268
The determination of damages is perhaps the most contentious part of the 9/11 VCF. Submission of a claim
261Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 §403 [hereinafter ATSSSA].
262Id. at §404(a)(1) - (2).
263Id. at §405(c)(2)(A)-(C)
264Id. at §405(c)(2)(A)(i)
26528 C.F.R. 104.2(b)
26628 C.F.R. 104.2(c)
267Id.
268Id.
56to the special master waives any right to ﬁle a claim in state or federal court for the damages suﬀered.269
To help individuals make an informed decision, the special master published a table providing the estimated
awards available to claimants. Individuals deciding to ﬁle a claim must provide information about the phys-
ical harm,270 economic and non-economic losses,271 and information on any collateral oﬀset of losses.272
In determining the presumed income, the special master uses the human capital approach to valuation. The
economic theory behind this method is an attempt to estimate the present value of all the money an individ-
ual would receive over their lifetime. The calculation involves estimating an individuals’ future income and
subtracting their future consumption. In implementing this approach, the special master starts with the age
of the claimant and their after-tax compensible income plus beneﬁts.273 The special master then projects
this income stream over the work-life expectancy taking into account inﬂationary changes and unemployment
risks.274 From this number, the special master subtracts the decedants’ annual consumption. The special
master then caculates the present value of this future income stream using a discount rate based on current
yields of mid- to long-term Treasury securities.
The special master calculated these values for a variety of ages and wages. For example, a twenty-ﬁve
year-old married individual with no children who earned $100,000 per year has a presumed economic and
non-economic loss of $4,425,645.275 On the other hand, a similarly situated ﬁfty year-old earning $50,000
269ATSSSA, supra note 261, at §405(c)(3)(B)(i). Additionally, an individual with pending litigation must withdraw her claim
within ninety days of the establishment of the regulations.
270Id. at §405(a)(2)(B)(i).
271Id. at §405(a)(2)(B)(ii). The statute deﬁnes economic loss as “any pecuniary loss resulting from harm (including the loss
of earnings or other beneﬁts related to employment, medical expense loss, replacement services loss, loss due to death, burial
costs, and loss of business or employment opportunities) to the extent recovery for such loss is allowed under applicable State
law.” Id. at §402(7). It deﬁnes non-economic loss as “losses for physical and emotional pain, suﬀering, inconvenience, physical
impairment, mental anguish, disﬁgurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium
(other than loss of domestic service), hedonic damages, injury to reputation, and all other nonpecuniary losses of any kind or
nature.” Id. at §402(9) In the ﬁnal regulations, the presumed non-economic loss is $250,000 plus $100,000 for a spouse and
each dependant. 28 C.F.R. 104.44
272ATSSSA, supra note 261, at §405(a)(2)(B)(iii).
273United States Department of Justice, Explanation of Process for Computing Presumed Economic Loss
274Id. The special master used the expected work-life of “All-Active Males” regardless of gender. On average, men have a
longer expected work-life than women of the same age.
275United States Department of Justice, Presumed Economic and Non-Economic Loss for a Married Decedent with No
Children Before Any Collateral Oﬀset (available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/vc matrices.pdf).
57has presumed losses of $802,228.276
Additionally, the special master must oﬀset the compensation award by any payments “related to the
terrorist-related aircraft crashes.”277 This provision means that the special master subtracts life insur-
ance proceeds from the calculation. Punitive damages are unavailable.278 The special master must make his
determination in 120 days and the payment twenty days after the determination.279 The process aﬀords the
claimants some due process protections. During the process, claimants can be represented by an attorney
and present evidence.280 Claimants can appeal awards but the special masters also hear the appeals.281
C.
Results
The 9/11 VCF has been underutilized and subject of much criticism. As of February 25, individuals have
submitted 1050 claims and the special master has provided award notiﬁcations to 176 individuals.282 Fifteen
percent of individuals responding to award notiﬁcations have ﬁled an appeal.283 Compared with claims ﬁled
under the NCVIA or tort claims, the notiﬁcation time is quick. Nevertheless, only one third of potential
claims have ﬁled for awards.284 Many potential claimants are reluctant to ﬁle because they think the com-
pensation system is unfair.285 They would prefer to take their chances in court rather than accept a low
claim award.
276Id.
277ATSSSA, supra note 261, at §405(b)(6) and §402(6).
278Id. at §405(b)(5).
279Id. at §405(b)(3) and §406(a).
280Id. at §405(b)(4)(A) - (B).
281On February 18, ﬁfteen percent of claims had been appealed. The special master expects all appeals to be heard by the
end of 2004. See David W. Chen, A SlowDeliberate Process of Judging 9/11Victim Awards, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 2003, at B1.
282United States Department of Justice, September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001: Award Notiﬁcation and Distri-
bution, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/payments.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
283Id.
284Id.
285See, e.g., David Chen, supra note 281, at B1.
58Since the inception of the fund, there have been numerous criticisms about the method of calculating com-
pensation. At the start of the fund, the collateral oﬀset provision was a large source of contention. The ﬁnal
regulations excluded charitable donations from the deﬁnition of a collateral oﬀset.286 Some contend that
Congress intended these payments to be oﬀset. Nevertheless, the special master excluded these payments
under pressure from charitable organization who threatened to withhold their charity payments.287 An ad-
ditional source of contention is that collateral oﬀsets penalize those individuals who bought life insurance
and beneﬁts risk takers who did not purchase the appropriate level of insurance. In particular, the collateral
oﬀsets greatly reduce the returns of high wage earners who purchased policies commensurate with their
projected income stream but received reduced payments from the fund.
Once the special master issued the compensation tables, there were additional complaints of unfairness from
both high wage earners and low wage earners. The compensation tables highlight the equity issues of the
compensation program. Families of lower wage earners argue it is unfair to give them ﬁve or ten times less
than the amount other individuals are receiving. For some claimants, it is a money issue. They need the
compensation to support the family, pay tuition, or retire on time. For other claimants, it is an aﬃrmational
issue. They argue that the government is devaluing the life of their loved one by oﬀering a lower amount.
In meeting with the families, the special master often responds to this criticism by noting that Congress
required economic harm to be considered.288 This statement is partially true. While the statute does state
that economic harm should be taken into account, it also states that the special master should consider
individual circumstances. In fact, a reporter for the New Yorker “heard him promise to give a widow an
28628 C.F.R. 104.47(b)(1). The ﬁnal regulation exclude several payments from the collateral oﬀset: (1) charitable gifts such
as housing, food, or clothing, (2) charitable donations distributed by privately funded charitable entities, and (3) tax beneﬁts
from the Federal government. 28 C.F.R. 104.47(b)(1)-(3).
287In an interview with the New York Times, Mr. Feinberg stated that the charities threatened to “hold up distributing the
charitable money until I cut each family’s check...so they wouldn’t be subsidizing the taxpayer...I blinked. I’m not going to
hold up $2.5 billion worth of charity.”
288Responding to this question from a mother on Staten Island, Special Master Feinberg said “’What you’re really asking is:
All lives are equal, why isn’t everybody getting the same amount of money?...A very fair question, ladies and gentlemaen.
The answer is: Congress told me that is not the way to compute these awards. Congress said you must take into account the
economic loss suﬀered by the victim’s death.” Kolbert, supra note 260, at 44.
59additional half million dollars for no other reason than that she had come in with her two small children and
asked for it.”289
Claimants at the upper end of the claim chart also are complaining about their distributions. The construc-
tion of the chart underscores some of their complaints. First, the special master only published information
for individuals earning less than $225,000. Second, the special master ﬁlled in the cells for young high-wage
earners with X’s. These clues underlie an approach that takes to heart the advice of Senators Kennedy
and Hagel to not “let twenty percent of the people get eighty percent of the money.”290 Though the actual
economic loss might be much greater, the special master indicated that he will rarely give out more than six
million dollars.
Recently, seven relatives of victims who worked for Cantor Fitzgerald ﬁled a lawsuit against the special
master.291 The lawsuit has four major contentions that repeat many of the concerns Cantor Fitzgerald
expressed to the Department of Justice in a report compiled by the law ﬁrm Skadden, Arps and the con-
sulting group Chicago Consulting.292 First, the lawsuit contends that the special master incorrectly used
after-tax income to calculate the lost earnings.293 In calculating lost earnings, the special master adhered to
the human capital method of using after-tax earnings. The theoretical justiﬁcation is that the wage earner
would only have after-tax income to use for consumption. The plaintiﬀs claim that the special master should
have followed New York law that requires the use of pre-tax income in determining wrongful death awards.
Depending on the age and the income level of the diseased, this change could increase some awards by more
than one million dollars.
The second claim is that the special master should have applied a uniform rate of consumption between
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291David W. Chen, 7 Families Sue Administrator of 9/11 Fund, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 2003, at B1.
292See Submission of Cantor Fitzgerald L.P., Espeed, Inc. and Tradespark, L.P. to the Special Master of the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 to the Department of Justice available at [hereinafter Cantor Fitzgerald Report]
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60married and single individuals.294 According to the human capital method, income consumed should be
subtracted from income earned. Individuals who are married consume less than single individuals because
of economies of scale and the availability of the spouse’s supplemental income. For example, they may
share utility payments, car payments and food expenses. Additionally, payments come from both spouses’
paychecks. On the other hand, New York law treats married couples and single individuals identically.295
The diﬀerent treatment could have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on awards. For example, a single individual who earns
$70,000 will spend on average 60.8 percent for personal expenses. Married individuals, however, only spend
17.8 percent of their income.296
The third claim has several parts. First, it argues that the special master should have used income data
from 2001 to calculate the average income.297 Second, the claim argues that the special master should have
used the New York salary growth rate rather than the national growth rate.298 Finally, it argues that the
calculation should have considered other forms of compensation including bonuses and stock options.299
Many of the criticisms underscore the larger issue of the amount of discretion given to the special master.
He was given incredibly broad powers ranging from promulgating the regulations to reviewing the decisions.
Additionally, there is little transparency throughout the process. Nevertheless, some claimants are pleased
with the process and its relatively expeditious determinations.
D.
Conclusion
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61Congress quickly constructed the 9/11 VCF to provide compensation for those killed and injured on Septem-
ber 11th. Since its inception, the 9/11 VCF has been the subject of extensive criticisms. Nevertheless, it is
important to study for several reasons. First, many critics question the method of calculating compensation.
Second, it is an interesting study for the appropriate discretion to give to the special master.
Part VII: Discussion
Clearly the current patchwork approach to compensation created by HSA Section 304 and workers’ compen-
sation does not provide comprehensive coverage for smallpox vaccine injuries. As a result, ﬁrst responders
have been relatively unresponsive to the vaccination eﬀort. The last three sections explored other approaches
to compensation programs and tried to draw lessons from their successes and failures. This part relies on the
previous parts to construct a smallpox vaccine compensation program that will provide the proper incentive
for ﬁrst responders to receive the vaccine. The ﬁrst section outlines a proposed smallpox vaccine compen-
sation program. Though it outlines the potential provisions piecemeal, the proposed program draws heavily
from the NCVIA. The second section reviews a recent House bill to establish a compensation program.
Finally, the third section outlines a newly introduced proposal by the HHS.
A.
A Proposal for a Smallpox Vaccine Compensation Program
This section outlines a proposal to compensate certain individuals for smallpox vaccine injuries. Each
subsection addresses the policy justiﬁcations for a particular provision and draws from the discussion in
previous parts. When viewed as a whole, this program would be closely related to the NCVIA.
1. Complete Liability Waiver with Governmental Right of Contribution
62In constructing a compensation system, it is important to determine who should bear the cost in the ﬁrst
instance. Under a traditional liability regime the vaccine manufacturer compensates plaintiﬀs for their
injuries. As the examples in this article illustrate, many compensation systems shift the burden to the
government. As with the childhood vaccines, this section recommends an exemption from liability for
smallpox vaccine manufacturers in order to insure a stable and cheap supply of vaccines.
It is clear from the Swine Flu Act and the NCVIA that vaccine manufacturers will not produce the smallpox
vaccine without liability protections. In both cases, the uncertainty of litigation made it diﬃcult to obtain
liability insurance.300 Without cost eﬀective liability insurance, vaccine manufacturers must either self-insure
or leave the market. During the vaccine crisis of the 1980’s, the market for some vaccines shrunk to one
manufacturer.301 Many vaccine manufacturers were pharmaceutical companies with diversiﬁed businesses.
As such, they were able to withstand any short-term detriment as they reallocated capital to other projects.
Those companies remaining in the market priced their vaccines prohibitively high. As a result the incidence
of illness increased at the end of the 1980’s vaccine crisis. With some experts calling the smallpox vaccine the
most dangerous vaccine available, escalating prices and market exodus would occur if manufacturers were
exposed to liability.
Additionally, traditional policy considerations do not favor imposing liability on the vaccine manufacturer.
First, manufacturers are not the cheapest cost avoiders because they produce unavoidably unsafe products.
Regardless of the manufacturer’s precautionary steps in producing the vaccine, some individuals will suﬀer
adverse reactions. Second, it is not sound policy to have vaccine manufacturers spread the costs. In the initial
stages, distribution of the smallpox vaccine will be limited and liability exposure will be high. Spreading
the cost through the vaccine price would signiﬁcantly raise the price. This situation is much diﬀerent than
the facts of Escola where imposing liability without fault had a vanishingly small eﬀect on the price of
300See discussion supra Part V, Section A.
301Id.
63Coke. Indeed the price of the DPT vaccine more than doubled in two years during the vaccine crisis of
the mid-80’s.302 Additionally, it would spread the costs too narrowly. Rather than the general public, the
“consumers” of the vaccine are ﬁrst responders. These individuals are principally state employees and health
care professionals. In a time of state budget crises and escalating health care costs, these entities are in no
position to act as deep pockets.
However, a program should not completely exempt manufacturers from paying in all circumstances. Certainly
the biggest concern with a total exemption is it creates a disincentive to take optimum precautions in
manufacturing vaccines. Obviously a major purpose of the tort system is to provide incentives to take cost-
justiﬁed measures. If there were no recovery from manufacturers then there would need to be other sources of
quality control. A traditional source of quality standards is the market. If the market demands quality goods,
then manufacturers must compete for customers on the basis of quality. However, several characteristics cast
doubt on the eﬃciency of the vaccine market. First, it is probably not informationally eﬃcient. Assuming
that there was a selection of vaccines with varying quality, it is not clear that the consumer could ﬁnd
information, analyze it, and make the proper choice. Second, it is not a competitive market. Vaccine
manufacturers have an oligopoly meaning there will be little market-based quality competition.
In addition to potential market controls, there are regulatory controls. The major justiﬁcation for regulatory
control is the failure of the market to regulate quality. The FDA is an external source of quality control for
biologics. If we believe that the FDA eﬀectively regulates manufacturers, then a liability provision would be
redundant. Under this assumption, a compensation system could exempt manufacturers without eﬀecting
the quality of the vaccine. As a practical matter this approach is not prudent. While the FDA does an
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64excellent job of quality oversight, the threat of litigation is always in the background.
None of the three historical approaches provided a complete waiver to manufacturers. While The Swine Flu
Act did not allow the injured party to sue the vaccine manufacturer directly, it did allow the government a
right of contribution for negligent or reckless conduct. On the other hand, the VICP allows claimants to ﬁle
suit in federal court after they reject the ﬁndings of the special master. Finally, like the Swine Flu Act, the
9/11 VCF also allowed a right of contribution by the United States against a negligent manufacturer.
Additionally, some argue that public conﬁdence in the Vaccination Plan may decrease if the manufacturers
were exempt from liability. This argument is not compelling. At present, the consumers of the vaccine are
limited to the ﬁrst responders covered by Secretary Thompson’s declaration. The immediate concern is the
incentives of this narrow group to receive the vaccine. Press accounts characterize their main concern as
uncertainty about compensation rather than poor manufacturing quality control.
An alternative to an absolute exemption would be an exemption for all non-negligent actions by the man-
ufacturer. This approach would retain the incentive to act non-negligently. There are several possibilities.
One possibility would be to allow private rights of action against manufacturers. While this approach would
result in enforcement, it may also result in excessive litigation. Though they were often unsuccessful, plain-
tiﬀs brought many cases against the United States under the Swine Flu Act on negligence theories. Another
possibility would be to allow the United States to bring claims against a manufacturer for negligence. Both
the Swine Flu Act and the 9/11 VCF adopt such an approach. Such a provision provides the appropriate
incentives while curbing the possibilities of nuisance litigation.
In conclusion, any compensation program must exempt manufacturers from liability. Signiﬁcant exposure
65to liability could destroy the infrastructure for vaccine innovation. Nevertheless, some mechanism must
be available to ensure quality. This section argues for a right of contribution by the U.S. against vaccine
manufacturers.
2. Compensation System for First Responders
Having determined the extent of manufacturer liability, the next step is to determine eligibility. This section
argues for the availability of compensation for ﬁrst responders and those individuals secondarily-infected by
ﬁrst responders.
The argument for compensating ﬁrst responders is stronger than the traditional justiﬁcation for vaccine
injury compensation. For traditional vaccines, there are two levels of health policy. At the individual level,
it is clear that some vaccines provide a net beneﬁt to the vaccinee. For these vaccines, public health oﬃcials
have determined that the probability and magnitude of harm from the disease is greater than the probability
and magnitude of harm from potential side eﬀects of the vaccine. As a result, a rational individual would
choose to receive the vaccine. Clearly, some individuals will suﬀer side eﬀects. From an ex post perspective,
they would not have decided to receive the vaccine. Nevertheless, this fact should not change their decision
ex ante.
Presumably, every individual faces the same probability of suﬀering an adverse side eﬀect. In a world of
costless contracting, individuals would negotiate with each other before vaccination to pool money to pay
for an injury. This arrangement would serve as a type of insurance. Obviously, transaction costs makes this
a practical impossibility. However, a statutory system of compensation serves the same purpose.303
The argument becomes stronger with the addition of the group level justiﬁcation that vaccination beneﬁts
the public as well as the vaccinee. When there is no immunity to disease, it passes from person to person with
303For an excellent discussion of the economics of vaccine policy, see Michael I Krauss, Vaccines and Products Liability in
Products Liability (Matthew Bender) ¶51.04.
66each person serving as a reservoir for the pathogen. When individuals have immunity, they are no longer
reservoirs of the pathogen and will not spread the disease. As a result, only unvaccinated individuals can
spread the disease to other unvaccinated individuals. As the number of unvaccinated individuals decreases,
the likelihood that two unvaccinated individuals will come in contact to transfer the disease also decreases.
This eﬀect is known as “herd immunity.”304
Herd immunity, however, actually creates the perverse incentive for individuals to free-ride immunity from
vaccinated individuals. People will no longer risk a vaccine injury to receive immunity because herd immu-
nity protects them. Free-riding becomes a problem if enough people forgo vaccinations because there will
no longer be herd immunity. Compensation for vaccine injuries counteracts this incentive by reducing the
downside risk of vaccination.
The Vaccination Program involves an entirely diﬀerent calculus because the public is the chief beneﬁciary.
According to the CDC Draft Proposal, the risk of a smallpox outbreak is not high enough to justify the risk
of vaccinating the general public.305 In this case, the probability and magnitude of an injury from smallpox
exposure is less than the probability and magnitude of a vaccine injury. Rational individuals would not
choose to be vaccinated.
However, it is not an individual calculation for ﬁrst responders. The calculation must include the beneﬁt
to the public rather than just to the individual. The public beneﬁt of vaccinating ﬁrst responders is the
ability to perform their duties during a smallpox attack without the fear of infection. In the CDC’s view, the
probability and magnitude of injury to the public is greater than the probability and magnitude of injury to
the ﬁrst responder.306 Therefore, they recommended that ﬁrst responders receive the vaccine. In a world of
costless contracting, the general public would aggregate and pay the ﬁrst responders to assume the risk of
vaccination in order to provide protection. A compensation program merely provides the same result. The
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67public is paying for vaccine injuries because it would beneﬁt if there were a smallpox attack.
Clearly this argument has a moral component and an eﬃciency component. The moral claim is that society
should repay individuals who sacriﬁce themselves for the beneﬁt of society. This justiﬁcation applies to both
ﬁrst responders and to individuals secondarily infected by ﬁrst responders. Certainly, this justiﬁcation has
strong moral appeal but it is not uniformly applied in our society. Some of the most vocal opponents of the
9/11 VCF were relatives of people killed attempting everyday acts of “heroism.” For example, the special
master received a letter from a widow of a husband who died trying to save a drowning child in a swollen
river.307 Why, she asked, does society owe a debt of gratitude to one set of heroes and not another? Clearly,
she is correct. If there were a moral justiﬁcation for compensating one set of individuals then certainly
that same justiﬁcation would apply to the other.308 But this does not mean that no one should receive
compensation.
The other component of the argument is eﬃciency. The vaccine will injure some ﬁrst responders and they
will sue. A compensation program would be justiﬁed if the sunk costs of vaccination and compensation were
less than the expected value of expenses paid in the future without a vaccination program. These costs
include medical expenses for injuries that would not have occurred if ﬁrst responders were vaccinated and
any litigation costs associated with vaccine lawsuits. The “expected value” of these costs is the probability
of paying this sum multiplied by the sum. If the expected value were greater than the current costs of com-
pensation then a compensation program would be justiﬁed on eﬃciency grounds. Certainly, this calculation
is diﬃcult because it requires assigning a probability to the risk of smallpox attack.
While one can make this eﬃciency argument, the strongest argument is pragmatism. As described in the
307Kolbert, supra note 260, at 45.
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68introduction, the Vaccination Plan is currently stalled because ﬁrst responders are demanding adequate pro-
tections. If the policy goal is complete participation in the Vaccination Plan, then compensation must be
made available to ﬁrst responders. As long as the Vaccination Plan is voluntary, then the ﬁrst responders
have leverage to demand compensation. Similarly, if ﬁrst responders will not receive the vaccinations unless
society compensates secondarily-infected individuals, then pragmatic concerns also justify compensation of
secondarily-infected individuals.
In conclusion, there are several justiﬁcations for compensating ﬁrst responders and secondarily-infected indi-
viduals. First, there is the moral argument that society should repay people who sacriﬁce themselves for its
beneﬁt. Second, there may be an eﬃciency argument that society will probably enjoy a beneﬁt worth more
than the cost of compensation. Finally, there is the pragmatic consideration that voluntary vaccinations
will not be successful without these provisions. As a result, this Article recommends compensating ﬁrst
responders and secondarily-infected individuals.
3. No Compensation System for Non-First Responders
There is no justiﬁcation for compensating non-ﬁrst responders until President Bush widens the Vaccination
Plan. First, the individual-level justiﬁcation for compensation does not apply. There is no public bargain
because a majority of the public is not receiving the vaccine. Until smallpox vaccinations are nationally
mandated, only a certain number of individuals would receive the vaccine. Costless contracting would only
occur between those who received the vaccine so the group would be much smaller than the general public.
Second, there is no herd immunity because a majority of the public will be unvaccinated. In the absence of a
desire for herd immunity, there is less reason to incent vaccination. Finally, these individuals would receive
the vaccine solely for their own beneﬁt rather than to allow them to beneﬁt society. As a result, none of
the justiﬁcations apply to non-ﬁrst responders. If the President were to extend the Vaccination Plan to the
general public then there would be a compelling case for a complementary compensation scheme.
694. Tort Approach Rather Than Workers’ Compensation
Having established the need to compensate ﬁrst responders for vaccine injuries, it is now necessary to dis-
cuss the structure of the compensation system. Currently, there is a two-tier system consisting of workers’
compensation and tort recovery. Either compensatory mechanism could be used as a doctrinal anchor for
a compensation system. Indeed their operation would be similar in many circumstances. Nevertheless, a
tort-based system is better than a workers’ compensation-based system because it can address situations
that would doctrinally stress a workers’ compensation-based system.
As discussed in Part III, workers’ compensation is available for federal workers under FECA and to non-
federal employees depending on substantive state regulations. Certainly, one approach to compensation
would be to create a uniform system of workers’ compensation. This approach could operate through one
system at the federal level or through mandatory substantive minimums at the state level. For most cases,
this approach would be a straight-forward inquiry into whether the injury arose from employment. Since
“arising from employment” would essentially mean “arising from vaccination,” the inquiry would be similar
to tort-based causation. Additionally, a workers’ compensation-based system could use causation tables to
facilitate recovery.
Nevertheless, the workers’ compensation model is less eﬀective for injuries arising from secondary transmis-
sions. Many public health oﬃcials cite the real possibility that ﬁrst responders will unintentionally transmit
the vaccinia virus to other individuals. Of particular concern is the possibility that physicians will transmit
the virus to at-risk individuals such as the immuno-compromised.309 Another concern is the transmission
to family members. In either case, compensation for the secondarily-infected clearly falls outside the tradi-
tional model of workers’ compensation. At the federal level, FECA handles this problem by deeming some
secondarily infected individuals to be within reach of the provisions. Certainly, this statutory ﬁction is one
309See discussion supra Part II Section E.
70way within workers’ compensation to permit recovery for the secondarily infected. Nevertheless, in creating
a system from scratch, the more doctrinally pure approach would be tort-based.
A tort-based approach would import the traditional inquiry into the compensation system– duty, breach,
causation, and injury. Adopting a strict liability like recovery would eliminate the need to show a duty or a
breach of that duty. Instead, a person could receive compensation if they showed that they were injured and
that the vaccine caused the injury. By limiting the showing to causation and injury, this doctrinal framework
more easily handles the problem of compensating the secondarily infected than a workers’ compensation ap-
proach.
5. Table Causation
For drug and vaccine litigation, causation is often the most diﬃcult obstacle to recovery. During the Swine
Flu litigation, the government informally reduced this burden by settling the easy cases. This approach
provided quick compensation to individuals clearly suﬀering from GBS. The NCVIA followed suit by es-
tablishing a formal system of presumptive causation for Table Injuries. Though it is the subject of some
criticisms, the NCVIA has been a relative success. For injuries falling under the Vaccine Table, this method
has greatly expedited claim determinations. Certainly this approach could be adopted for smallpox vaccine
injuries. For injuries listed on the table, the claims process would be greatly simpliﬁed. As a result, this
Article recommends enacting a vaccine injury table for the smallpox vaccine.
While a vaccine injury table reduces the burdens during claim determination, it would require signiﬁcant
time and eﬀort to construct. The diﬃculty of implementing a smallpox vaccine injury table would vary
by injury. For many cases, the link between an injury and the vaccine would be clear. Side eﬀects such
as progressive vaccinia, generalized vaccinia and eczema vaccinatum will have characteristic physical symp-
toms.310 For these injuries, proof of causation should not be diﬃcult and the claim process should be swift.
310See discussion supra Part 2 Section D.
71Additionally, it should be relatively simple to construct an injury table for these side eﬀects.
Unfortunately, the most diﬃcult cases from a causation standpoint will also be the most diﬃcult medically
to diagnose. Both postvaccinial encephalopathy and encephalitis are rare but life-threatening side eﬀects of
the smallpox vaccine. Their clinical symptoms are largely neurological and may be unaccompanied by any
dermatological abnormalities.311 Clearly it would be hard to establish causation-in-fact for these side eﬀects.
Undoubtedly a vaccine table would facilitate recovery but it could be diﬃcult to design. These side eﬀects
do not present unique symptoms that would distinguish it from other causes. Rather, experts would need to
collect data on incidence rates and time periods that would estimate causation to an acceptable statistical
level. A more liberal temporal component would permit some recovery unrelated to the smallpox vaccine.
A more stringent approach would fail to compensate all vaccine injuries. Regulators would have to try to
strike the proper balance between these positions.
The design of the vaccine table will be even more complicated for secondary transmissions. The current VICP
Injury Table creates a matrix of symptoms and time limits. A vaccine table including secondary smallpox
transmissions may be unable to contain the temporal component because claimants would not know when
they came in contact with a vaccinated individual. For the “dermatological” side eﬀects, the lack of temporal
information may be inconsequential because the physical manifestations are clear. A clinically characteristic
lesion would indicate vaccinia contact without knowing when the contact occurred. For neurological side
eﬀects, the task would be much more diﬃcult.
Though there will be some diﬃculties designing the vaccine table, it would create beneﬁts by simplifying the
claims process. If one goal of the compensation program is to reduce administrative burdens, then it should
include a simpliﬁed method for proving causation. Though it would require some initial work, a vaccine
injury table is the best approach to facilitating recovery.
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726. Table Compensation
As shown by the underwhelming response to the 9/11 VCF, the success of a compensation system depends
heavily on the method of determining compensation. If the compensation is too low or if it is perceived as
unfair, then people will not participate. This section analyzes the diﬀerent approaches and components to
compensation. It recommends reimbursement of medical expenses, uniform damages for pain and suﬀering,
and damages for economic losses determined by the human capital method.
In crafting the compensation arrangement for injuries there are several policy considerations. First, the
system should be horizontally equitable meaning that the program should compensate similarly situated
individuals the same amount. One criticism of the 9/11 VCF is that it creates some horizontal inequities.
The discretion conferred to the special master by Congress allows him to augment the table compensation.
Indeed there are instances where he increased a compensation award beyond the table amount.312 Second,
some people argue that the system should be vertically equitable meaning that it treats diﬀerent people
diﬀerently. There is less support for vertical equity than horizontal equity. Finally, and most importantly,
the compensation system should provide the proper incentives to receive the vaccine. If the goal of the com-
pensation system is to induce ﬁrst responders to be vaccinated, then it should be structured to accomplish
this goal.
Several policy considerations are in tension with these concepts. First, it is unlikely that any system would
have open-ended compensation. A criticism of the 9/11 VCF from both sides of the aisle is its failure to
cap liabilities. Despite an explicit statutory mandate, the special master has exercised his discretion to hold
down the cost of the program. The legislative history of the 9/11 VCF shows that the hurried circumstances
312See discussion supra Part VI Section C.
73resulted in an uncapped program. Any legislation under less time pressure would receive signiﬁcantly more
scrutiny. With budgetary constraints, it may be impossible to accomplish every policy goal. A second
policy consideration is administrability. Any compensation system that attempts to minimize vertical and
horizontal inequities may be administratively burdensome.
With these policy considerations as background, there are three possible approaches to compensation. The
ﬁrst approach would pay a uniform amount to a victim. For example, the VICP pays $250,000 for a death.
Similarly, the 9/11 VCF creates a presumption of $250,000 for non-economic damages. The advantages of
a uniform compensation system are administrative ease and horizontal equity. There are no calculations or
subjective valuations and the system would treat every case identically. On the other hand, a uniform system
is not vertically equitable because everyone would be paid the same amount regardless of her circumstances.
Additionally, uniform compensation is unlikely to provide optimal incentives to all individuals.
The second approach would vest discretionary authority in the decision-maker to determine the appropri-
ate amount of compensation. This approach would permit ﬂexibility to consider individual circumstances.
Finally, the third approach would conﬁne the special master to determining damages from a damage table
based on certain factors such as income and age. This would reduce the administrative burden of calculating
damage awards while providing some consideration for diﬀerences between individuals.
In applying these principals there are three levels of compensation: medical expenses, pain and suﬀering,
and economic damages. Clearly any compensation system should pay for unpaid medical expenses. All
three historical approaches to compensation include medical expenses in the compensation determination.
Certainly, a system for uniform payment would be extremely unfair because side eﬀects greatly vary in
severity. Alternatively, the program could completely indemnify the injured party or it could provide the
average expense for the injuries. Both approaches would be administratively easy. Additionally, total reim-
74bursement would reduce the possibility of an injured individual receiving substandard care. On the other
hand, it provides an incentive for the injured party to overutilize care and for the provider to overprovide
care. Alternative approaches would be prospective payment systems similar to Medicare reimbursement or a
statutory mandate to only reimburse reasonable charges. Clearly a limitation for reasonable charges would
be the simplest to implement.
The second decision is the valuation of non-economic damages. Both the NCVIA and the 9/11 VCF place
a presumptive value on non-economic damages at $250,000. For the 9/11 VCF, the special master created
this presumption because he did not want to judge the individual circumstances of the deaths. Certainly,
the estimation of pain and suﬀering damages is diﬃcult because of its inherent subjectivity. Nevertheless,
there will be a wide-range of side eﬀects in the Vaccination Plan. It would be horizontally inequitable to
give an individual suﬀering from eczema vaccinatum the same recovery as the estate of a person who died
from post-vaccinial encephelopathy. A good compromise would be to provide uniform pain and suﬀering
damages to each injury on the injury table. For example, all individuals suﬀering post vaccinial encephelopa-
thy would receive an identical amount that would be more than the compensation received by individuals
suﬀering from eczema vaccinatum. This approach would strike a balance between equity considerations and
administrability.
A more contentious issue is the valuation of economic damages. The 9/11 VCF is a paradigmatic use of the
human capital method for determining economic damages. The income cash ﬂows are projected over a per-
son’s lifetime and discounted into present dollars. While it is a theoretically pure approach to compensation,
the public is very uncomfortable with the 9/11 VCF’s economic valuations of life. While juries routinely
engage in such calculations, the compensation fund creates a comparative framework. A ﬁfty year-old in-
dividual earning $50,000 per year can look at a table and ﬁnd that the government values his life by one
quarter of a 35 year-old earning $100,000. Additionally, a compensation system appears to be a voice of the
75state whereas jury awards seem more removed.
From a theoretical perspective, the human capital approach to economic valuation is the most pure.313 Addi-
tionally, the human capital approach more closely approximates the optimal incentive structure. The optimal
compensation is the amount that would make the ﬁrst responder indiﬀerent between receiving the vaccine
with compensation for any injuries and not receiving the vaccine.314 For a person to be indiﬀerent between
these choices, a compensation system must fully cover their economic and non-economic expenses.315 These
values vary by individual. As a result, it is necessary to calculate individual losses.
For example, the second phase of the Vaccination Plan encourages the vaccination of some doctors, nurses,
paramedics, and policemen. A uniform compensation regime would either under-incent or over-incent partici-
pation in the program. If compensation was set at the optimal level for policemen, then it would under-incent
doctors. On the other hand, if the compensation was set at the level for doctors, then it would over-incent
the other professionals. Clearly, the most eﬃcient compensation scheme would not provide uniform recovery.
As demonstrated by the extent of criticism over the 9/11 VCF, it is not enough to adopt the human capital
approach. Rather there are many other issues that must be addressed.316
313See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act 52 Stan. L. Rev. 547, 562 (2000). For policy decisions,
economists use the statistical value of life because the victim is unknown ex ante. For wrongful death, the idenitity of the
victim is known so the human capital approach is appropriate. Id.
314It is possible that the optimal compensation is below this amount
315There might be a third component. The economic damages would cover any lost income. In theory, the non-economic
damages should make the person indiﬀerent about the pain and suﬀering. The third component is a risk premium to compensate
for forcing a person to bear the risks of the potential injuries.
316The litigation of the 9/11 VCF highlights some of these considerations. See discussion supra Part VI Section C. The
ﬁrst problem is establishing a base salary to project into the future. In the lawsuit against the 9/11 VCF special master,
plaintiﬀs argued that it was incorrect to not include the salary information for 2001. While it is important to use current
income information, it is not clear that incomes from 1998 through 2001 would accurately reﬂect future income streams. To the
extent that there was an income bubble during this time period, then the compensation system would overcompensate those
individuals. On the other hand, this may not be a problem for ﬁrst responders because their income may not have been inﬂated
during the late-90’s like they were for employees on Wall Street.
Another issue is the determination of the number of years left in the labor market. Currently, men average a longer work-life
expectancy than women. The 9/11 VCF only used the data for males. Another issue is the determination of the proper growth
rate for salaries. The rate varies by geography and job classiﬁcation. The 9/11 VCF uses the national salary growth rate to
determine the future income stream.
76In conclusion, determining the appropriate compensation scheme is important and controversial. The success
of the compensation program to encourage vaccinations depends on the program providing the appropriate
level of compensation. This Article recommends reimbursement for out-of-pocket medical expenses. Ad-
ditionally, it recommends uniform awards for pain and suﬀering depending on the side eﬀect. Finally, it
recommends the human capital method for determining economic losses.
7. Federal Program
A program administered at the Federal level beneﬁts from economies of scale. The number of adverse reac-
tions to the smallpox vaccine will be relatively small. Spread over ﬁfty states, this number becomes much
smaller. It would be an administrative burden to have ﬁfty programs to provide compensation to a small
number of individuals in each state.
Additionally, uniformity is important to the success of the vaccination program. Starting with the premise
that the country needs a compensation program to reduce the downside of vaccinations, it follows that there
must be a threshold compensation arrangement that provides the appropriate incentives to ﬁrst responders.
Presumably, a federal system would be at or above such a threshold. If the design of the compensation
program is left to the states then the concern is some states will adopt programs below the threshold
arrangement. These suboptimal programs would not fully incent ﬁrst responders to receive the vaccinations.
Assuming that the vaccination program is the appropriate defensive mechanism, this undervaccination will
create a chink in the defensive armor.
Additionally, states would not fully internalize the costs of their undervaccination. Clearly, a smallpox attack
in one state could spread to many states. In crafting a compensation regime, each state would only include
their costs in the calculation. If neighboring states provided adequate remedies then the problem would be
77magniﬁed. Setting substantive regulations at the optimum level would eliminate this problem. Nevertheless
there is still the beneﬁt of administrative eﬃciency if the program is consolidated at the federal level. As a
result, any compensation program would be best administered at the federal level.
8. Oﬃce of Special Masters
Having established the need for a compensation system and discussing its substantive contours, it is important
to determine who will administer the program. There are several options. It could be administered through
the court system, through a special appointment, or through existing framework. While each approach has
potential beneﬁts, the purpose of the system is most easily eﬀectuated by using the special masters in the
Court of Federal Claims.
Though the system would substantively alter the current tort regime, one possibility would be to allow the
claims to be brought in federal court. The Swine Flu Act adopted this approach. One advantage is that
judges are well equipped to handle these types of claims. On the other hand, the substantive provisions of the
proposed compensation system reduce the complexity of the claims. Additionally, it may be an unwise use of
resources to add cases to the dockets of currently overburdened courts. One way to alleviate administrative
stress would be to consolidate the claims in one district court. Additionally, it would eliminate duplicative
procedures. This approach would essentially codify the Swine Flu approach of consolidating through the
JPML.
Another approach would be to appoint an independent special master to handle the claims. The 9/11 VCF
adopts this approach. Advantages of this approach are administrative ease and establishing an expert to
handle the claims. However, criticisms of this approach include a lack of transparency, a lack of accountability,
and unfair results. These are legitimate concerns but they may be a structural problem with the 9/11 VCF
rather than an intrinsic problem of special masters. There are several solutions. Meticulous minutes could
78be kept and the special masters decision could be reviewable. Similarly, the statute could vest less discretion
in the special master.
Despite these possible reforms, it is more sensible to use a currently established system. The NCVIA created
an oﬃce of special masters within the Court of Federal Claims. Presumably, these oﬃcials are experienced
at handling such claims. Additionally, the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit have appellate
jurisdiction over decisions of the special masters decisions. One drawback is the backlog of cases under the
NCVIA. A major criticism of the process is that it has not eliminated the slowness or uncertainty of the
outcomes. Again, the slow nature of compensation from VICP might be from the program rather than
inherent. There is currently signiﬁcant legislative interest in improving the administrative aspect of the
NCVIA. Hopefully, the implementation of a smallpox vaccine compensation program would coincide with
improvement in the administration of the VICP.
9. Conclusion
This Article recommends a limited smallpox vaccine compensation program for vaccine injuries. Because of
its similarities, it could be enacted most easily be amending the NCVIA. It would make recovery available
to ﬁrst responders and secondarily-infected individuals. The NCVIA Vaccine Table would be amended to
include the smallpox vaccine and the common injuries arising from the vaccine. Unlike the NCVIA, there
would be no alternative causes of action available for dissatisﬁed claimants against manufacturers. Rather,
only the U.S. government could seek a right of contribution against vaccine manufacturers. Other diﬀerences
from the NCVIA include the use of damage tables for economic damages and for pain and suﬀering. Finally,
special masters in the Court of Federal Claims would hear the claims. Certainly, Congress should address
some of the current issues with the VICP including the adversarial nature of the DOJ. Nevertheless, the
NCVIA oﬀers the best source for quick recovery by injured vaccinees.
79B.
A New Development: House Bill No. 865
On February 13, California Representative Henry Waxman introduced a bill (the Waxman Bill) in the
House that attempted to address various perceived shortcomings of President Bush’s Vaccination Plan.317
In addressing these deﬁciencies, the Waxman Bill seeks to achieve several purposes. First, the bill attempts
to ensure that ﬁrst responders will be able to receive health care through several provisions.318 Several
provisions mandate substantive beneﬁts that would prevent private insurers from not covering smallpox
vaccine injuries and leaving ﬁrst responders without access to care. The proposed statute also requires
states to provide all medically necessary care to any ﬁrst responder who has not received compensation
under the compensation program.319 Additionally, the bill would amend ERISA to require employee health
plans to not alter the level of coverage for vaccine side eﬀects.320 Second, the bill tries to address the potential
problem of employers discriminating against employees based on vaccination status. The bill would forbid
employers from discharging employees for declining to receive the smallpox vaccine.321
Finally, and most importantly for this Article, the bill would establish a “Smallpox Program” to compensate
for smallpox vaccine injuries. Mechanistically, the Waxman Bill would amend the NCVIA to include the
smallpox vaccine and would enable the Secretary of HHS to promulgate regulations to include smallpox in
the VICP.322 Compensation would be available to any individual suﬀering side eﬀects listed on the Vaccine
317In a statement, Representative Waxman stated that “workers are understandably reluctant to accept a vaccine to protect
the public while being forced to face the consequences of an adverse reaction alone.” Title Smallpox Vaccine Compensation
and Safety Act of 2003, 149 Cong. Rec. E. 268 (Feb. 13, 2003). He also dismissed the availability of workers’ compensation as
“not adequate.” Id.
318Smallpox Vaccine Compensation and Safety Act of 2003, H.R. 865, 108th Cong. (2003).
319Id.
320Id.
321Id.
322Id.
80Table after receiving the smallpox vaccine. The bill would also allow secondarily-infected individuals to ﬁle
a claim.323
Many of the substantive provisions of the Waxman Bill must be added. For example, it does not provide
a list of covered side eﬀects. Rather, the Waxman Bill only calls for an amendment to the Vaccine Table
without listing the conditions that should be included on the table. It explicitly does not allow recovery for
minor scarring or local reactions.
The Waxman Bill is diﬀerent from the traditional NCVIA process in several ways. Like the NCVIA, the
Smallpox Program would not be the exclusive remedy because the Waxman Bill would allow claimants to
ﬁle negligence actions under HSA Section 304. However, this approach diﬀers from the NCVIA because the
U.S. would be the defendant and the plaintiﬀ would have to prove negligence. Nevertheless, similar to the
NCVIA, individuals choosing to bring a claim under HSA Section 304 would ﬁrst have to ﬁle a petition for
compensation. Finally, funding for the Smallpox Program would be identical to the funding of HSA Section
304 actions rather than from the Vaccine Trust Fund established by the NCVIA.
The Waxman Bill would enact many of this Article’s recommendations. Most notably, it would use the
NCVIA as a template for recovery including the use of table causation and special masters. Additionally,
compensation would be available to both individuals receiving the smallpox vaccine and secondarily-infected
individuals. Perhaps the largest divergence is the Waxman Bill still permits recovery under HSA Section 304.
This provision would allow individuals to ﬁle negligence claims under the FTCA if they were dissatisﬁed
with their results. Certainly, this provision is better than allowing individuals to ﬁle claims against the
manufacturer as permitted by the NCVIA. Nevertheless, it is encouraging that the legislature has taken the
323Id.
81initial steps to respond to the compensation problem.
C. Another New Development: The HHS Proposal
In response to the increasing public demand for compensation and the introduction of the Waxman Bill
in the House, the HHS unveiled a competing plan (the HHS Proposal) on March 6, 2003.324 Presenting a
much diﬀerent approach than the Waxman Bill, the HHS modeled the system after the Public Safety Oﬃcers
Beneﬁt (the PSOB) program–an obscure statute established in 1976 to compensate law enforcement oﬃcers
and ﬁreﬁghters seriously injured or killed in the line of duty. Using this law as a template, the HHS Proposal
would make compensation available for certain injuries and cap beneﬁts at $262,100.325 This section outlines
the proposed program and compares it with the Article’s proposed program and the Waxman bill.
The origin of PSOB began in the early 1970’s as an eﬀort to attract more people to law enforcement positions.
From 1965 to 1974, the number of law enforcement oﬃcers killed in the line of duty in the United States
rose from 53 to 132.326 This trend meant oﬃcers were facing greater risks for little compensation in return.
As a House committee report stated:
The physical risks to public safety oﬃcers are great; the ﬁnancial and fringe beneﬁts are
not usually generous; and the oﬃcers are generally young with growing families and heavy
ﬁnancial commitments. The economic and emotional burden placed on the survivors of a
deceased public safety oﬃcer is often very heavy.327
The burden on survivors was also severe because it was diﬃcult to obtain appropriate levels of life insurance.
324United States Department of Health and Human Services, Press Release: HHS Proposes Smallpox Vaccination Compensa-
tion Plan (available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2003press/20030305.html) [hereinafter HHS Proposal]
325Id.
326H. Rpt. 94-1032 at 3.
82While police oﬃcers’ salaries were low, their insurance premiums were extremely high.328 The increasingly
high risks and correspondingly low compensation discouraged individuals from becoming law enforcement
oﬃcers. Responding to this problem, Senator McClellan of Arkansas introduced the Public Safety Oﬃcers’
Beneﬁts Act of 1976.
The PSOB provides compensation to public safety oﬃcers or their survivors for death or permanent and
total disability. To receive death beneﬁts, a public safety oﬃcer must have (1) died (2) as a direct and
proximate result of,329 (3) a personal injury,330 (4) suﬀered in the line of duty.331 To receive permanent
and total disability payments, a public safety oﬃcer must (1) be permanently and totally disabled,332 (2) as
a direct result of,333 (3) a catastrophic injury334 (4) in the line of duty.335 Claimants qualifying for either
death beneﬁts or permanent and total disability beneﬁts receive $262,100.336 There is no collateral oﬀset for
additional life insurance coverage.337 Rather, the PSOB provides compensation beyond any beneﬁts received
from other sources. However, beneﬁts are unavailable under certain circumstances including intentional
misconduct, voluntary intoxication, and grossly negligent conduct.338
Though the PSOB is an obscure statutory provision, the HHS Proposal would extend the PSOB program
to the Vaccination Plan’s ﬁrst responders.339 Presumably, the PSOB already covered some ﬁrst responders.
More speciﬁcally, those employed as police oﬃcer or ﬁre ﬁghter would already be eligible for PSOB compen-
sation if the vaccination were considered in the line of duty. The HHS Proposal would just extend death
328See Public Safety Oﬃcers’ Beneﬁt Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary 94th Congress, 94-816 (statement of Senator Strom Thurmont) at 21.
329See 28 C.F.R, §32.2(d)
330See 28 C.F.R. §32.2(e).
33142 U.S.C. §3796.
332See 28 C.F.R. §32.2(h).
333See 28 C.F.R. §32.3(d).
334See 28 C.F.R. §32.2(f)
335See 28 C.F.R. §32.2(c).
33642 U.S.C. §3796.
33728 C.F.R. §32.18.
338See 42 U.S.C. §3796a.
339HHS Proposal, supra note 324.
83beneﬁts and the permanent and total disability beneﬁts to all ﬁrst responders covered by the secretary’s
declaration.340
There are several provisions in the HHS Proposal beyond the PSOB system. First, the HHS Proposal would
compensate individuals for two thirds of their lost wages.341 This provision becomes eﬀective after the ﬁfth
day of missed with recovery capped at $50,000.342 Further, it would operate secondary to any recovery
through workers’ compensation or any disability insurance. Second, the HHS would compensate individuals
for all reasonable out-of-pocket medical expenses.343 Again, this provision would only be available where
other health insurance coverage would be unavailable.344
The HHS Proposal is similar to the Waxman Bill in several ways. First, it provides for supplemental health
care coverage. Both plans would reimburse individuals who had insuﬃcient health care coverage. Second, the
proposals provide a death beneﬁt, though they are diﬀerent. Whereas the Waxman Bill oﬀers $800,000 for a
death, the HHS proposal only provides $262,100. Finally, both plans cover secondarily-infected individuals.
Many of the diﬀerences involve the level of compensation. Most importantly, the cap on lost wages would
severely limit recovery under the HHS proposal. Whereas the Waxman Bill would oﬀer complete compen-
sation for lost wages, the HHS proposal would provide a cap at $50,000. For a young doctor permanently
disabled by the vaccine, this diﬀerence could equal several million dollars.
Certainly, the HHS constructed their proposal to create uniformity rather than vertical equity. These provi-
sions create administrative ease and control costs. In fact, administration oﬃcials were eager to note that the
HHS Proposal would only cost $20 to $30 million per year.345 As a theoretical matter, however, this proposal
under-incents ﬁrst responders because it does not fully compensate their losses. This undercompensation
340See HHS Proposal, supra note 324.
341Id.
342Id.
343Id.
344Id.
345Ceci Connolly, White House Agrees to Beneﬁts for Health Workers Sickened by Vaccine, Wash. Post, March 6, 2003, at
A1.
84aﬀects both physicians and public safety oﬃcials with the $50,000 cap amounting to less than one year of
wages for most physicians and many police oﬃcers.
Whether this theoretical problem translates to an actual problem depends on the response of ﬁrst responders.
If they receive the vaccination in response to the HHS Proposal then the theoretical problem of underincen-
tiﬁcation is academic. However, the initial response from several unions is tepid. A representative of the
American Nurse’s Association stated, [w]e appreciate they recognize it’s a problem, but there’s a long way
to go from what we’re looking for.346 Certainly, the response of the unions should concern administration
oﬃcials because union leaders have been a driving force in the initial call for compensation. The success
of any program will partially depend on the ability to persuade these individuals of the merits of the plan.
Nevertheless it is still too early to know the fate of the HHS Proposal.
D. Conclusion
This Part discussed several proposals for smallpox vaccine compensation programs. Both the Article’s
recommendation and the recent Waxman Bill use the NCVIA as a template. The key diﬀerence between
these proposals is the Waxman Bill would allow suits under HSA Section 304 against the United States.
The HHS Proposal uses the obscure PSOB as a framework for compensation. While it would cover medical
expenses, the HHS Proposal would oﬀer very limited compensation for lost wages.
It seems clear that the administration wants to contain costs. However, this objective is in direct tension
with the goal of complete participation in the Vaccination Plan. The Waxman Bill and this Article’s proposal
would most likely result in complete participation but would result in high costs. The HHS Proposal would
be cost eﬀective but may not encourage people to receive the vaccine. Presumably, there is an optimum
level of compensation between these two positions that would encourage vaccinations while controlling costs.
346Id.
85Hopefully, dialogue between industry representatives and administration oﬃcials will result in developing
this optimum approach.
Part VIII: Conclusion
After the events of September 11th and the anthrax attacks, it is clear that the United States must be
proactive in providing homeland security. Currently, one of the most signiﬁcant threats is the potential for
a bioterrorist attack. Addressing this concern, the White House unveiled the Vaccination Plan to better
protect our country in the event of a smallpox attack. Despite mechanisms for expedient implementation,
the Vaccination Plan has failed to vaccinate most of the designated ﬁrst responders.
The biggest reason for this failure is that the current patchwork regime does not provide complete com-
pensation coverage. By the statutory action of HSA Section 304, only negligence claims can be brought
against the United States. Additionally, the availability of workers’ compensation is unclear in many states.
Current opinion suggests that the Vaccination Plan will be an unmitigated failure without comprehensive
compensation for vaccine injuries.
As outlined in this Article, there are historical precedents for no-fault compensation systems. Drawing from
these examples, this Article recommended a federal compensation program largely based on the NCVIA.
Recent legislation by Representative Waxman would provide many of the features mentioned in this Article.
A competing proposal by the HHS would oﬀer less compensation but would also be much cheaper.
Regardless of the substantive provisions, public dialogue is important because it is the best way to protect our
homeland security. Certainly, recent developments show administration oﬃcials and industry representatives
moving in the correct direction. Hopefully, discussions over the next weeks will result in a satisfactory and
democratic solution that provides adequate protection to us all.
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